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[L. A. No. 2,,288. In Bank. Apr. 7, 1960.] 
lWSS MESSNER, Respondent, v. JOURNEYMEN BAR-
BERS, HAIRDRESSERS AND COSMETOLOGISTS, 
INTEHNATIOXAIJ l.1NTON OF AMERICA, LOCAIJ 
256, et a1., Appellants. 
[1] Labor-Picketing-Law Governing.-A case involving the right 
of a union to picket a barber shop to secure a union shop 
agreement must be decided under state law, since a barber is 
not engaged in interstate eOUlmerce. 
[2] Id. - Right of Union to Engage in Concerted Activities. - A 
union Ulay use the various forms of concerted action, such as 
strike, picketing or boycott, to enforce an objective that is 
reasonably related to any legitimate interest of organized labor. 
[3] Id.-Object of Concerted Labor Activity.-The object of con-
certed labor activity JlJust be proper and must be sought by 
lawful means, oth('rwise the persons injured by such activity 
JlJay obtain damages or injunctive relief. 
[4] Id.-Collective Bargaining Contracts.-Employers are not r('-
quired by law to engage in collective bargaining, and closed or 
union shop agreements and concerted activities to achieve them 
are lawful whether or not a majority of the ('mployees directly 
involved wish such agl'eements. 
[5] Id. - Right of Union to Enga.ge in Concerted Activities. - The 
members of a labor organization llIay have a substantial inter-
est ill the employment relations of nn employer although none 
of them is or ever was employed by him, and whel'e union and 
nonunion employees arc engaged in a similar occupation and 
their respective elllplo~'ers are engaged in trade competition 
with each other, the union's efforts to extend its membership 
to the employments in which it has no foothold is not an un-
reasona ble aim. 
[6] Id. - Right of Union to Engage in Concerted Activities. - A 
union may use economic pressurc to achieve a closed or union 
shop agreement though the employees in the picketed shop do 
[2] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Labor, § 74 et seq.; Am.Jur., Labor, § 372 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 12] Labor, § 23; [2, 3, 5-7] Labor, 
§20a: [4] Labor, §3a: [8] Labor, §18; [9,10,18] Labor, §21; 
[11] Labor, § 1.1; [13] :Monopolies and Combinations, §§ 1, 5: 
[14~ Monopolies and Combinations, § 6; [15-17] Monopolies and 
Comhinations, § 7. 
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not belong to the union and hnve no dispute with their em-
ployer. 
[7] ld.-Right of Union' to Engage in Concerted Activities.-The 
hardship arising from a labor union's struggle for organizn-
tion does not render less legitimnte the objectives of the union 
in seeking orgnnization or the objectives of a nonunion shop 
in resisting it, or the objectives of nonunion workers who may 
either join or resist. Confronted with the legitimate objectives 
of all parties concerned in such a struggle, it is not for the 
courts to abate it, however aware they may be of its inevitable 
hardships; they are bound to remain aware also that they cnn-
not properly encroach on the function of regulation that 
belongs to the Legislature. 
[8] ld.-Labor Unions-Closed or Union Shop Agreements.-Lab. 
Code, §§ 920, 921, 923, relating to promises to join or remain 
in or withdraw from a labor organization and to public policy 
as to labor organizations, do not affect the propriety of closed 
or union shop agreements and concerted activities to obtain 
such agreements. 
[9] ld.-Jurisdietional Strikes-Labor Organizations.-Under Lab. 
Code, §§ 1117, 1118, relating to jurisdictional strikes, a labor 
organization is not formed merely by an agl'eement of em-
ployees not to be organized. A group whose sole purpose is to 
express the wish of its members not to deal as a group with 
the employer "concerning grievances, Inbor disputes, wages, 
hours of employment or conditions of work" is not an organi-
zation that exists for the purposes of § 1117, since it lacks 
the purpose "of denling with employers concerning grievances, 
labor disputes, wages, hours of employment or conditions of 
work." 
[10] ld.-Jurisdictional Strikes-Labor Organizations.-A juris-
dictional strike cnn only arise out of a "controversy between 
two or more labor organizntions as to which of them has or 
should have the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an 
employer ... [01') to Ilfiye its JIll'lllbers perform work for an 
employer" (Lab. COUI', § 1118) ; the wish of all or some of the 
employees to work ill nn open shop without collective bargain-
ing is the antithesis of a demand for the "exclusive right to 
have [their) members pl'rform work for [the) employer." 
[11] ld.-Legislative Policy.-With the exception of enactments 
outlawing the employer's usc of the yellow-dog contract (Lab. 
Coue, §§ 920-922) and labor's usc of the jurisdictional strike 
(Lab. Code, ~§ 1115-1122), the legislative policy favors free 
competition for jobs by lawful, peaceful means. 
[12] ld.-Picketing.-If plaintiff nonunion barber was offl'reu the 
same rights of unionlllelllbership as the elllploYl'e melllbers, de-
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fend ants' peaceful picketing to compel him to join the union 
was proper because the businessman-worker operating in an 
industry or field in which he c,ompetes with organized workmen 
Dlay be subjected to the same means of persuasion as any 
other workman to join the union and conform to the condi-
tions regulating union labor. 
[13] Monopolies and Combinations - Restraint of Trade: Cart-
wright Act.-Combinations entered into for the purpose of re-
straining competition and fixing prices are unlawful under the 
common law and the Carhnight Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 16700 et seq.) 
[14] Id. - Cartwright Act - Agreements and Combinations Pro-
hibited.-Although human labor is not a "commodity" under 
the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16703), a service 
consisting in the main of human labor is. 
[15] Id. - Cartwright Act - Agreements and Combinations Pro-
hibited.-Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16703, is not limited to exempt-
ing from the Cartwright Act agreements that set the price of 
labor; reasonably interpreted it was intended to except from 
the operation of the act combinations of laborers for purposes 
of furthering their interests by collective bargaining, when 
not otherwise unlawful. 
[16] Id.-Cartwright Act-Labor Unions.-A labor union, acting 
alone, yiolates the CartwrigM Act only when its primary pur-
pose is to accomplish a restraint of trade, not when its purpose 
is to obtain a valid labor objective. 
[17] Id.-Cartwright Act-Labor Unions.-Where a minimulll 
price schedule in a union shop agreement setting percentll~e 
wages for barbers was not price-fixing but wage-fixing, thc 
presence of employer-barbers in the union did not convert 
the contract into an agreement between III bor groups and non-
labor groups for the purpose of restraining trade. 
[18] Labor-Jurisdictional Strikes-Financial Factors.-The pur-
pose of Lab. Code, § 1122, in the Jurisdictional Strike Act, pro-
viding that "any person who organizes an employee group 
",·hich is financed in whole or in part, interfered with or domi-
nated or controlled by the employer or any employer associn-
tion, as well as such employer assocjation, shall be liable to 
suit by any person who is injure.d thereby," is to give an action 
for damllges to any person injured by the formation of a coJ)J-
pany union. Employers arc prohibited from financing labor 
unions hec:.nlsc such finllncing might render a union less indl'-
pendent and thus lc!'s able to represent its members efi'ectin·l.\· 
[13] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Monopolies, Combinations and Restraint" 
of Trade, § 3 et seq. 
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vis-a-vis the employer; but where the employer is himself a 
workman, his dues are no different from those of nny other 
member and would not give him control over union power lind 
policy. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. James C. Toothaker, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to enjoin defendants from picketing a barber shop. 
Judgment for plaintiff reversed. 
Todd & Todd and Henry C. Todd for Appellants. 
Carroll, Davis, Burdick & MeDonough, Roland C. Davis, 
John E. Thorne, Johnson, Thorne, Speed & Bamford, Morgan, 
Beauzay, Smith & Holmes, R()brrt Morgan, Charles P. Scully 
and Victor Van Bourg as Amiei Curiar on behalf of Appel-
lants. 
Gray, Cary, Amcs & 1<'rye and Ward W. 'Vaddell, Jr., for 
Respondent. 
Severson, Davis & Larson, Nathan R. Berke and George 
Brunn as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment of the 
trial court enjoining them from picketing plaintiff's barbl'r 
shop to secure a union shop agreement. 
Plaintiff is a barber, working with the tools of the tradt'. 
During the summer of 1957 dl'fcIHlants attempted to organi;,:e 
all the barber shops in the San Diego area. They submitted II 
contract to plaintiff that would have required him and Ids 
four barber employees to join defendants' organization. Dr-
fendants did not represent an;y of plaintiff's employees, awl 
the employees do not wish to join the uuion or to be repre-
sented by defendants. Plaintiff's refusal to sign the contract 
led to drfendants' praceful picketing'. After about a week the 
pickets were removed by stipulation pending the decision 
in this case. 
[1] Since plaintiff is not rllgaged ill interstate commerce, 
tllis case must be decided ul1l1rr state law. [2] It is clear 
that "a union ma~' use the various forms of concerted action, 
such as strike, picli:/'ting, or boycott, to enforce an objective 
that is reasonably related to allY legitimate interest of organ-
ized labor .. '. [3] It is equally well settled that the object 
) 
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of concerted labor activity must be proper and that it mnst 
be sought by lawful meanf;, otherwise the persons injured by 
such activity may obtain damages or injunctive relief." 
(James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 721, 728-729 [155 P.2tl . 
329, 160 A.L.R. 900] and cases cited.) If defendants' peace-
ful picketing was diree1ed toward a proper object, the injunc-
tion was erroneously granted. The crucial issue in this case, 
therefore, is whether a closed or union shop agreement is a 
proper objective of a labor union that does not represent any 
of the employees directly involved. 
That issue was decided in C. S. Smith Met. Market Co. v. 
Lyons, 16 Cal.2d 3Be [106 P.2d 414], and McKoy v. Retail 
Automobile S. L. U'fIwn No. 1067, 16 Cal.2d 311 [106 P.2d 
373], and ''I'as reaffirmed in Petri Clefmers, 111c. v. Automotive 
Employees, etc. Local No. 88, ante, pp. 455, 474-475 [2 Cal. 
Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76]. [4] In the course of holding in 
the Petri case that an employer was not required to bargain 
collectively with a union representing a majority of his em-
ployees, this court said: •• [w] e conclude that employers are 
not required by law to engage ill collective bargaining and 
that closed or union shop agreements and concerted activities 
to achieve them are lawful in this state whether or not a 
majority of the employees directly involved wish such agree-
ments." Since the concerted activities in the Petri case werc 
conducted by a union that represented a majority of the em-
ployees at the time the activities began, we were there COll-
cerned with the issue of this case only inferentially. We 
deem it appropriate to set forth the law on this issue by a 
detailed discussion of the controlling authorities. 
As early as J. F. Parki'flson Co. v. Buildi'flg Trades 001l'f1cil 
(1908),154 Cal. 581 [98 P. 1027,16 Ann.Cas. 1165,21 L.R.A. 
N.S. 550], this court held that it was not unlawful for a union 
to call a strike of employees and order a boycott to bring 
pressure on an employer who retained a nonunion worker and 
thereby to enforce a closed shop. The elimination of the com-
petition of nonunion workers was held a proper objective of 
concerted labor activity, and the court was unanimous in ho1t1· 
ing a strike a proper metllOd of attaining this end. The con-
clusion of the Parkinson case that a closed shop is a proper 
labor objective was reaffirmed in Pierce v. Stablemen's Unio'fl, 
156 Cal. 70 f]03 P. 324], even though the picketing in that 
case was enjoined because it involved force and violence. 
) 
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The preeise issue of this case was raised and decidpd in 
C. S. Smith Met. 1Ilm·ltd Co. v. Lyolls, 16 Ca1.2d 389 [106 
P.2d 414], a suit to restrain a union from pitlwting and boy-
cotting a food market to organize the nonunion butchers antl 
to obtain a closed shop agreement. No labor dispute f'xisted 
between the employer and the butchers in that case alld nOlle 
of them wished to join the picketing union. [ 5 ] 'l'he court 
held that the concerted activity was proper because "[ t] he 
members of a labor organization may have a substantial 
interest in the employment relations of an employer although 
none of them is or ever has been employed by him. The reason 
for this is that the employment relations of every employer 
affect the working conditions and bargaining power of em-
ployees throughout the industry in which he competes. Hence, 
where union and nonunion employees are engaged in a similar 
occupation and their respectiYe employers are engaged in trade 
competition one with another, the efforts of the union to extend 
its membership to the employments in which it has no foothold 
is not an unreasonable aim." (l d., at 401.) 
In McKay v. Reta,il Automobile S. L. Union No. 1067, 16 
Ca1.2d 311 [lOG P.2d 373], this court held that a labor union 
that represented none of an employer's salesmen could law-
fully engage in concerted activity to obtain a closed shop 
agreement since that objective had a reasonable relation to 
the betterment of the conditions of labor. Substantially the 
same conclusion was reached in L'U1ld v. Auto 'Mechanics Union 
No. 1414,16 CaL2d 374, 378 [106 P.2d 408]. 
In Shafer v. Registered Pharmadsts U11ion, 16 Ca1.2d 379 
[106 P.2d 403], involving a strike by plaintiff's union pharma-
cists to obtain a closed shop agreement, the propriety of the 
closed shop as a labor objective under common-law principles 
was conceded and the crueial question was whether sections 
920, 921, and 923 of the Labor Code outlawed closed shop 
agreements. Recognizing that tllese sections were enacted 
to outlaw yellow-dog contracts, the court held that they "lay 
no statutory restraints upon the workers' efforts to secure a 
elosed shop contract from an employer .... " (ld .• at 388.) 
In Sontag Clwin Stores Co. v. Supcri01' Court, 18 Ca1.2d 92 
[113 P.2d 689], the court followed its earlier decisions by 
holding that the superior court had exceeded its jurisdiction 
in permanently restraining a union from peacefully picketing 
to obtain a union shop agrE'ement. [6] The principle that 
a union may use economie pressure to aCllieye a closed or union 
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shop agreement even though the employees in the picketed shop 
do not belong to the union and have no dispute with their em-
ployer, established in the foregoing case8, has been restated in 
many cases not directly concerned with the point. (Magill Bros. 
v. Buildi1lg Servi.cc etc. Union, 20 Ca1.2d 506, 508 [127 P.2d 
542] ; James v. Marinship OOl·p., 25 Ca1.2d 721, 730 [15::> P.2d 
329, 160 .A.L.R. 900] ; Parl;; & T. I. Oorp. v. Inie1'1lOtiollal clc. 
o! Teamsters, 27 Ca1.2d 599, 604 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.T.J.n. 
1426] and cases cited; DeUillc v. American Fed. of Rad1'o 
Artists, 31 Ca1.2d 139, 144-145 [187 P.2d 769, 175 A.L.R. 382] ; 
Oha7'les H. Benton, Inc. v. Painters U1lion, 45 Ca1.2d 6i7, 683 
[291 P.2d 13] ; see F'ol·tcnbury v. S1lper·ior Court, 16 Ca1.2d 
405, 409 [106 P.2d 411]; Williams Y. International etc. of 
Boilermakers, 27 Ca1.2d 586 [165 P.2d 903]; Thompson v. 
Moore Drydock 00., 27 Ca1.2d 595 (165 P.2d 901].) 
'1'hus, for 50 years, until the four-to-three decision of this 
court in Garmon v. Sa.n Dicuo BlIil(?i1IU Trades C01l1lcil, 49 
Ca1.2d 595 [320 P.2d 473], in 1958, it was the settled law of 
this state that union labor could freely compete for jobs in 
the labor market and seek to improve wages and working COIl-
ditions by engaging in lawful concerted activities such as 
strikes and picketing. The law moreover recognized that union 
labor has a legitimate interest in organizing workmen in com-
peting nonunion shops to insure the benefits of collective bar-
gaining in union shops. Concerted activities such as picketing 
to acllieve that goal were legitimate even when the employees 
in the nonunion shops did not wish to join or to be represented 
by the union. Just as the union had to reckon with tIle risk 
that it might lose its struggle for organization, so the nonunioll 
employer rislted loss of business, and hence his emplo~'ecs 
risked 108s of employment, in resisting organization. 
Such risks, grim as they are, are the price of lawful com-
petition in a free enterprise system. The union plays for the 
high stakes of holding the gains it has made in union shops. 
The nonunion shop pla~'s for the high stakes of holding the 
competitive advantages it liaS again8t union shops. The nOll-
union workers must tlwn deeide between alternatives neither 
of which is of their own ('hoosing. They may welcome organi-
zation or merely accede to it a8 the lesser of two evils. On the 
other hand they may dislike organization, or merel~' regard 
it as a lost cause, or resist it out of fear of losing wl1at the~' 
presently hold or out of lJop(' that tlJ('y wi1l f'ml'rg<' as free-
) 
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riding benefil'iaries of ol'ganizations which their fellows "ill 
join and support. 
In the aos(')]('(' of ~talutory regulation the struggle can be 
bitterly hard on all sides. [7] The hardship does 110t 
render less legitimate the objectives of the union in seekillg 
organization or the objectives of the nonunion shop ill re-
sisting it, or the objectives of the nonunion workers who may 
either join or resist. Confronted with the legitimate objectives 
of all parties concerned in such a strugglc, it is not for tIle 
courts to abate it, however keenly aware they may be of its 
inevitable hardships. They are bound to remain aware also 
that they cannot properly encroach upon the function of 
regulation that belongs to the Legislature. 
In Ohavez v. Sargent, 52 Ca1.2d 162 [339 P.2d 801], how-
ever, a majority of this court ignored the traditional doctrine 
of separation of powers to write a state law of labor relatiolls 
based on the Taft-Hartley Act. That case suggested that many 
of the earlier cases had been superseded by the subsequent 
enactment of the Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-
1120, 1122). That conclusion was reached by interpreting 
section 1117, which defines a labor organization as "any 
organization or any agency or employee represcntation com-
mittee or any local unit thereof in which employees participate, 
and exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with 
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours 
of employment or conditions of work, which labor organiza-
tion is not found to be or to have been financed in whole or 
in part, interfered with, dominated or controlled by the em-
ployer or any employer association within one year of the 
commencement of any proceeding brought under this chap-
ter ... " to appl:r to a group of unorganized, nonunion em-
ployees who are satisfird with their terms and conditions of 
employment and therefore do not wish to enga.ge in collective 
bargaining. (Ohavez v. Sargent, wpm, at 197-203.) The con-
troversy between this unorganized group and a national labor 
organization as to whether the forJlH'r shall join tIle union was 
then converted into a jurisdictional strikr, defined by seetion 
1118 as "a concerted refusal to perform work for an employer 
or any other concerted interference with an employer's opera-
tion or business, arising out of a controversy between two or 
more labor organizations as to which of them has or should 
have the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an em-
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llave its members perform work for an employer" so as to 
make the act applicable to the fact situations of the 1\feKay, 
Shafer, Lyons and Fort('nhury cases, supra. 
Even under the Cliauc:: interpretation of the act, however, 
its terms cannot possibly apply to the Shafer and Fodcnbw'Y 
situations. In Sh(lf er, all of plaintiff's 14 pharmacists and 
assistant pharmacists who were eligible for memb('rship were 
union members and all but one wanted the closed shop agree-
ment. In Fortcnbury, the strike was conducted by employees 
of the shop as well as other ullion members. There was no 
question in either case of a dispute between rival labor organi-
zations; the only dispute was between the employees and the 
employer. [8] The Shafer case therefore established that 
sections 920, 921, and 923 of the Labor Code do not affect the 
propriety of closed or union shop agreements and concerted 
activities to obtain such agreements. (See Park & T. I. Corp. 
v. International etc. of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 609-613 
l165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426].) 
There is some reason, however, for the suggestion that the 
:McKay case, supra, has been superseded by the act because 
the employees in tbat case had formed an inside union. The 
court held, however, that the employees had failed to sustain 
the burden of proving that their organization was a "bona 
fide independent labor union." (ld., at 329-330.) Whether 
the act has superseded tllat case on its facts therefore depends 
on whcther the employee group was finaneed, interfered with, 
dominated or controlled by the employer. (Lab. Code, § 1117.) 
The act did not supersede the Lyons case, supra, however. 
[9] rnd!'r s('diollS ] 117 and 1118 of the Labor Code a labor 
organization is not formed merely by an agreement of em-
plo~'ees not to be organized. A group whose sole purpose is 
to express th(' wish of its memhers not to deal as a group with 
the employer "concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, 
hours of employment or conditions of work" is not an organi-
zation that exists for the pnrpos('s of section 1117, for it lacks 
the purpose "of dealing with employers eoncerning griev-
al1Ce~, labor disputes, wu:res, hours of employment or condi-
tions of work." (IJab. Code, § 1117.) Moreover, even if such 
a group eould be a labor organization und('r section 1117, its 
objection to organization of the SllOP could not give rise to a 
jurisoil·tional strike within the meaning of section 1118. 
[10] StH'h a st1'ikp call only arise out of a "eontroversy 
) 
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between two or more labor organizations as to which of thl'1l1 
has or should have tIle exclusive right to bargain eolledively 
with an employer ... [or] to have its members pC'rform work 
for an employer." (Lab. Codl', § 1118.) The wish of all or 
some of the employees to work in an open shop without col-
lective bargaining is thc very antithesis of a dl'mnnd for the 
"exclusive right to have [their] members perform work for 
[the] employer." 
In 1960, in Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, 
etc. Local No. 88, ante, p. 455 [2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 
76], the court disapproved the sweeping pronouncement of 
the Chavez ease and retraced its steps to the stare decisis of 
half a century, reaffirming the cumulative decisions from 1908 
to 1958. 
When it made that reaffirmation the court was mindful that 
no decision was possible that would not entail some hardship. 
Nevertheless it felt bound to respect the traditional principle 
of separation of powers that gives to the Legislature the re-
sponsibility of making any major changes in social and eco-
nomic policy. It made clear that the court would not establish 
by judicial legislation a little Taft-Hartley Act for California 
that only tIle Legislature can properly consider and enact. 
The Legislature is uniquely able to amass economic data and 
110ld hearill~s w11ere it can give heed to many representatives 
of the public besides parties to a eontroversy. It ean best 
determine whether there should be further governmental 
]'C'g"ulation of peaeeful competitive economic activity. 
[11] The Legislature has so far acted not only to outlaw 
thl' emplo~n'r's use of the yellow-dog contract (Lah. Code, 
~§ 920-922) hut also labor's use of the jurisdictional strike 
(Lab. Codl', §§ ]]]5-1]22.) With the exception of these prac-
tices the present legislative policy favors free eompetition for 
jobs by lawful peaceful means. Additional restrictions fiuch 
as those contained in "right-to-work" laws or little Taft-
Hartley acts have been defeated hy the pcople or tl1e Legis-
lature/ although they are alwa~Ts open to rl'consideration. 
'The California policy of course differs from policies of statcs with 
c1ifferent statutory proyisions. Twenty states haye "right·to-work" laws 
that prollibit union security contracts. (See disspnting opinion llcrein, 
footnote 7.) 'l'en other states have statutes spedfically requiring that 
union security contracts be supported by a majority vote of the em· 
ployees directly involved. These states, all except Hawaii cited in foot· 
note 4 of the dis~enting opinion herein, include Colorado (Rev. Stais. 
§ 80·5·(j (c), requiring approval of three·quarters); Connectieut (Gen. 
) 
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The P('tri case reaffirmed the traditional separation of powers 
that compels the judiciary to keep it'S distance from major 
formulations of policy. 
This court's interpretation of section 923 of the Labor Code 
(Shaje7' Y. Registc7'cd Pharma.cisis Ul1iol1, s1lpra) is in accord 
with tIle United States Supreme Court's interpretation of a 
similar provision of the Taft-Hartley Act. (§ 7, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 157.) Pointing out that " [b] asic to the right guaranteed 
to employ('C's in § 7 to form, join or assist labor organizations, 
is the right to engage in concerted activities to persuade other 
emplo~'ees to join for their mutual aid and protection" the 
l;nit('d States Supreme Court, after a review of the legislative 
materials, held that peaceful picketing for recognition by n 
union that does not represent a majority of the employees is 
not an unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (1) (A). (N.L.R.B, 
v. Dril'Cl's' Loca,l 639, 362 U.S. 274 [80 S.Ct. 706, 4 L.Ed.2d 
710]; 28 U.S.TJ. Week 4217, 4219, 4222, March 28, 1960.) 
The court's opinion makes plain that the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 does not " ... relegate 
this litigation to the status of an unimportant controversy over 
the meaning' of a statute which has been significantly 
changed." (ld., at 4218.) 
Sil1('e the judgment must be reversed, we deem it appro-
priatc to settle several questions of law that may arise on 
Stats. ~ 31-10;;(5), 31-106(a»; Hawaii (1959 Session Laws, Act. 210, 
p. 141); Idaho (Code, § 44-107, 1959 Supp.); Kansas (Gen. Stnt. ~ 44· 
80!) (4), also ine1uded in the 20 states with "right-to-work" laws 
and not cOllnted in these ten); Massachusetts (Ann. Laws, eh. 150A, 
§~ 4(3) and 5); Miclligan (Stat. Ann. § 17. 454 (15»; Minnesota 
(P-!nt. Aun. H 170.12 (3), 179.16 (1); New York (Laws Ann. I'h. 31, 
H 70'" (,,) 701;); Pennsylvania (Stats. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 211.6 (1) (e), 
~11.7 (:1); :md Wisconsin (Stat, Ann. § 111.06 (1) (c». Six states not 
ot1l('rwi~(' nr~ount('tl for and having only a provision more or less similar 
to s('ct ion (123 of th(' California Labor Code rea~h a result contrary to 
t1mt of Shafer v. RrgilJtcrcd Pharmacists Union, s1/pra. (Kentuc1Q', 
Main(', Mis~ouri, New Jersey, Washington and Wyoming. See eases 
I'ited in footnote 4 of the dissenting opinion herein.) Of the remaining 
thirt('('n stnt('s, six hm'c no specific st.atutes and of these three (Ncw 
l\f('xiro, R110cle Island, nnn West Virginia) support the majority view 
in tlli~ ens(' while threc (Ohio. Illinois, and perhaps New Hampshire) 
snpport thc diss('nt's "i('w. (8('c footnotes 6 and 8 of dissenting opinion 
hert'in. Thc Xcw lTampsllire I'n~c is unclear as to whether the union hall 
majorit~· snpport. That it 1md some support from the employees is clear. 
rWhite :Mt. Free::rr Co. v. lIfllrph11] 78 N.H. 398 [101 A. 357, 358].) Of 
the remaining scwn staTes, six nppnrcntly havc not Jlllssed on the point 
(A1n.I,a, De1aw:1re, lIfnTyland, Oklahoma, Vermont. and Mont:1na); allil 
on!' (Oregon) has r(')1<'n1('d its 1nhoT rplntions statutc and not "ct enaetpd 
anoth!'r (Ore. Laws, 191i!1, eh. ,jl;, ~ ]). Thus, nine states witl;out special 
ltatutes are opposed to the California position. 
I' 
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remand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 53.) The picketing ill this case 
was for a dual purpose: to achieve a union shop agreement 
and to compel plaintiff, as a barber working with the tools 
of the trade, to join the union. Despite the parties' contrary 
assumption, it is not clear whether the trial court enjoine(l 
picketing for the latter purpose. The judgment reads in part 
"[t]hat the defendants and each of them be and they hereby 
are enjoined from picketing the plaintiff's place of business ... 
in order to compel the plaintiff to execute the form of agree-
ment demanded by them or any other form of agreement, re-
quiring the plaintiff to compel his employees to join the De-
fendant Union against the will of the said employees." 
After defendants' national union amended its constitution 
to require that all barbers who work with the tools of the 
trade become members of a local union or an employers' guild, 
the courts of many states were called upon to determine 
whether a businessman-worker could properly be required to 
join a workman's union. Since many of the barber shops in-
volved in these test cases had operated as union shops before 
the amendment, several of the cases took the form of actions 
by the union to recover its union shop card or by the employer-
barber to retain the card. Some of the cases, therefore, hold 
only that the union may recover the card as an article of 
property and do not decide whether the employer-barber may 
be required to join thc union. (H cad Y. Local Union No. 83, 
Journeymen Barbers, 262 Ala. 84, 87-89 [77 So.2d 363] ; Rain-
water v. Trimble, 207 Ga. 306, 307-308 [61 S.E.2d 420]; 
Journeymen BaI'bers, Hairdresscrs, etc., Local 687 v. Pollino, 
22 N.J. 389, 398-401 [126 A.2d 194] ; Foutts v. Journeymell 
BorbC1'S, 155 Ohio St. 573, 577-581 [99 N.E.2d 782] ; cf. Wis-
consin Employ. Rel. Board v. Journeymen Barbers, 272 Wi~. 
84,90-94 [74 N.W.2d 815].) One case holds that the payment 
of union dues and fees by an employer constitutes the COll-
tribution of financial support to the union in violation of 
state statutes. (Journeymen Barbers eic., Local Uni01l No. 20;1 
v. Industrial Comm., 128 Colo. 121, 131-132 [260 P.2d 94]].) 
A third group of cases decides on the merits either that a 
union may properly require that a businessman-worker who 
competes with union labor join the union (COOllS v. J 01lrl1e1/-
71/e1l Barbers, 222 Minn. 100, 102-]05 [23 N.Vt.2d 345]; 
Romero v. Journeymen Barbers, 63 N.M. 443, 444-447 [321 
P.2d 628]) or that it may not do so (1(erkemcyer v. Jlfidlrifj, 
--Mo. -- [299 S.W.2d 409, 417] ; Grimaldi v. Local No.9, 
,,) 
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JOU1"ncymen Barbers, 397 Pa. 1 [153 A.2d 214, 215], cert. 
den., 361 U.S. 901 [80 S.Ct. 210, 4 L.Ed.2d 157].) 
[12] The law of California is that if plaintiff was offered 
the same rights of union mt·mbership as the elllplo.n'e members 
(Riviello Y. Journeymen Bm'be'/"s etc. Union, 88 Cal.App.2d 
499, 504-507 [199 P.2d 400] ; second opinion, 109 Cal.App.2d 
]23,124,129 [240 P.2d 361]), defendants' peaceful picketing 
to compel him to join the union was proper because" [t]he 
businessman-worker operating in an industry or field in which 
he competes with organized workmen may likewise be sub-
jected to the same means of persuasion as any other workman 
to join the union and conform to the conditions regulating 
union labor." (Bautista v. Jones, 25 Ca1.2d 746, 749 [155 
P.2d 343] ; see Emde v. San Joaquin Oounty etc. Oou?lCil, 23 
Cal.2d 146, 155 [143 P.2d 20, 150 A.L.R. 916].) Saleway 
Stores v. Retail Olerks etc . ..4.SS1l., 41 Ca1.2d 567 [261 P.2d 721], 
is not to the contrary. That case holds that organized labor 
may not, consistently with public policy, require store man-
agers who are agents of management to divide their loyalties 
by becoming union members. (ld., at 575.) Plaintiff owes no 
loyalty to any principal and thus will not be placed in the same 
position as the store managers by becoming a union member. 
Moreover, the store managers did not normally perform the 
same duties as the store clerks in the Safeway case (ld., at 572) 
and thus did not compete directly with the union members. 
Plaintiff, by choosing to compete on the same level as union 
barbers, threatens the union-won scale of terms and conditions, 
even if he voluntarily adheres to the same or a higher scale 
(see O. S. Smith Met. Market 00. v. Lyons, 16 Ca1.2d 389, 
401 [106 P.2d 414]). 
Plaintiff contends that since employer-barbers and pro-
prietor-barbers are members of the union, defendant union is 
not merely a labor organization but also a price~:fixing organi-
zation of employers. The union contract, offered to plaintiff in 
this case, sets the weekly wage of a full-time journeyman 
barber at 70 per cent of his gross receipts with a guaranteed 
minimum of $50 per week. Clause 13 provides that" [w] herea!> 
wages are paid on a percentage basis the prices to be charged 
under this Agreement in all Union barber shops not to be less 
than the following: [listing the prices for barber shop sen"-
ices]. " 
[13] Combinations entered into for the purpose of l'P-
straining competition and fixing prices are unlawful in this 
) 
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state under the common law (Speegle v. Board of Fi1'c Under-
writers, 29 Cal.2d 34,44 [172 P.2d 867]) and the Cnl'twrigllt 
.Ad. (Bus. & Prof. ('0<1<" § 16700 et seq.) [14] Although 
human labor is not a "commodity" under the ad (§ 16703), 
a service consisting in the main of human labor is. (People \'. 
Building Maintena11ce etc. Assn., 41 Ca1.2d 719, 723 [264 P.2(1 
31].) [15] Section 16703, however, is not limited to ex-
empting from the act agreements that set the price of labor. 
"Reasonably interpreted, [it] must be held to have been in-
tended to except from the operation of the act combinatiolls 
of laborers for the purposes of furthering their interests 
by collective bargaining, when not otherwise unlawful." 
(Schweizer Y. Local Joint Executive Board, ]21 Ca1.App.2d 
45,53 [262 P.2d 568].) Accordingly, "the real test in a par-
ticular case is the primary purpose of the agreement or com-
bination in question." (Schweizer v. Local Joint Executive 
Bom-d, supra, at 53.) [16] Thus, a labor union, acting 
alone, violates tIle Cartwright Act only when its primary pur-
pose is to accomplish a restraint of trade (Alpha Beta Food 
Mkts. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 147 Cal.App.2d 343, 
345-346 r305 P.2d 163] ; ](old Kist v. Amalgamated !lleat Cut-
ters, 99 Cal.App.2d 1Hl, 198-199 [221 P.2d 724] ; cf. O'Shea 
v. Tile Layers Um'oll, 155 CaI.App.2d 373, 376-377 [318 P.2d 
102] ; Miracle Adhesit·cs Cm'p. Y. Peninsula Tile Confr. Assn., 
157 Cal.App.2d 59], 594-595 [321 P.2d 482] ; see also Saveall 
v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70,72-73 [76 N.E.2d 12] ; Commonwealth 
v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 26:)-264 [93 N.E.2d 751] ; Purcell 
v. Journeymen Barbas, 234 l\Io.App. 843, 860 [133 S.W.2d 
662] ; but see Cleaners, Dyers, de. Union v, G.H.1Y. CleallN's 
&: D., 200 La. 83, 90-91 [7 So.211 623] ), not wIlen its purpose 
is to obtain a valid labor objective (Los Allgelcs P£c Ba.kers 
Assn. v. Bakery Drirers, 122 Cal.App.2d 237, 238, 243 [264 
P.2d 615] ; Schweizer v. Local Joint Board, supra; Local 24, 
Internat'l Broth. Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 292-295 
[79 S.Ct. 297, 3 L.Ed.2d 312] ). [17] As in the rent-fixing 
clause considered in Local 24, 11lfernat'l Broth. Teamsters v. 
Oliver, supra, the point of clause 13 is not priee-fixing, hut 
wage-fixing, and the presence of employer-barbers in the union 
does not convert the contract into an agreellH'nt bel\\'een labor 
groups and nonlabor groups for the purpose of restraining 
trade. (Cf. Alfred M. Lewis, /1Ir. v. WarrllOlIsc111cn ctc. Local 
No. 542, 163 Cal.App.2d 771 [330 P.2d 53] ; Allen Bradley Co. 
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1939] ; G{boncy v. Empire St01'a[Jc Co., 336 U.S. 490 [69 S.Ct. 
684,93 L.Ed. 834].) 
The conclusion we rearh is not inconsistent with Overland 
Pub. Co. v. H. S. Crocker Co., 193 Cal. 109 [222 P. 812]. 
In holding the agreement there involved between labor and 
nonlabor groups a violation of the Cartwright Act, this court 
said" [t]here is no question in our minds but that the pri-
mary purpose of this agreement was to create or carry out 
restrictions in trade or commerce ..... " (ld., at 115.) 
There is not a shred of evidence in the record in the present 
case to support a contention that such was the purpose of 
elause 13. 
Nor is our conclusion inconsistent with the general state-
ment in Speegle v. Board of Fi,'e Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34, 
44-45 [172 P.2d 867], that" [t]he public interest requires 
free competition so that prices will not be dependent upon an 
understanding among suppliers of any given commodity, but 
upon the interplay of the economic forces of supply and de-
mand. " That statement cannot be wrenched from its context 
to condemn activity that the case did not eontemplate. In the 
ar(>a of trade regulation the values of free competition them-
selves compete with the values of wage security. Clause 13 
sought to secure certain wages as in any other union contract. 
The difficulty of setting a fixed wage that is fair and reason-
able in a trade consisting entirely of personal services is ap-
parent. The union's method of setting the cost of its labor to 
the employer in the barber's trade by reference to price is 
appropriate in a service trade as it might not be in areas 
where the worker's labor is not so predominantly linked with 
costs. 
Respondent does not contend that the contract, if entered 
into between the union and an employer who does not work 
with the tools of the trade and hence does not belong to the 
union, is a violation of the common-law rule against price-
fixing. He contends only that the union itself is a price-fixing 
association because some employers belong to it who have 
agreed among themselves to support minimum prices. As 
noted earlier, however, tIle employer-barbers are required to 
join the union only because they work in direct competition 
with employee-barbers and could affect the wage s('ale ad-
versely if they were not subjected to union responsibilities, 
even if their individually established prire srales were above 
tIle union scale. (See C. S. Smith Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, 
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[18] Plaintiff also contends that because employer-mem-
bers are required to pay union dues and fees, defendant is 
an employee group financed ill part by <>mployers in violation 
of section 1122 of the Labor Code. That section provides: 
" [a] ny person who organizes an employee group which is 
financed in whole or in part, interfered with or dominated 
or controlled by the employer or any employer association, 
as well as such employer or employer association, shall be 
liable to suit by any person who is injured thereby. Said 
injured party shall recover the damages sustained by him 
and the costs of suit." Section 1122 is part of the Jurisdic-
tional Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120, 1122) and its 
plain purpose is to give an action for damages to any person 
injured by the formation of a company union. Even were 
defendant partly financed by the dues of employer-members, 
their dues would not give them control over union power and 
policy. Employers are prohibited from financing labor unions 
because such financing might render a union less independent 
and thus less able to represent its members effectively vis-a-vis 
the employer. When, as here, the employer is himself a work-
man, his dues are no different from those of any other member. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Journeymen Barbers, etc. Loeal Union 
No. 205 v. Indush'ial Com., 128 Colo. 121, 131-]32 [260 
P.2d 941], which reached a different result under a statute 
making the employer's contribution of financial support to 
a labor union an unfair labor practice (Colo. Rev. Stat. 
80-5-6 (1) (b) ), is misplaced. That case relied exclusively upon 
two earlier cases (Wisconsin Employ. ReT. BOQ1'd v. Journey-
men Bm·be1's. 256 Wis. 77, 85-86 [39 N.W.2d 725]; DiLeo 
v. Daneault, 329 Mass. 590, 595-597 [109 N.E.2rl 824]) that 
have b('en superseded by subsequent legislation (Wis. Stat. 
Ann. § 111.06 (I-b) (1957); Sf'C Wise01lsil1 Employ. Rel. 
Board v. Journeymen Barbers, 272 Wis. 84, 89-90 [74 N.W.2d 
815] ; Ann. Laws of Mass. ch. 150A, § 4(2) (1956»). 
In view of our conclusion that the trial court's judgment 
must be reversed, we need not consider defendants' con-
tention that even if their picketing was dirf'ei('d toward an 
improper purpose the trial court lacked power to issue an 
injunction in the absence of proof that plaintiff had been 
injured by their conduct. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., and White, J., concurred. 
) 
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SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-The majority today present 
the second installment of the ambitious project undertaken 
by tl]em in Petri Cleaners, Inc., v. A.uto'Ynotive Employees, etc., 
Local No. 88 (1960), ante, p. 455 [2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 349 
P.2d 76]. "The crucial issue in this case," say the majority 
(ante, p. 877), "is whether a closed or union shop agreement 
is a propcr objective of a labor union that does not reprcscnt 
1l1J~' of the employees dir('C'tJy involved." This brief declara-
tion appears, on further reading of the opinion, to be some-
what of an oversimplification of the problems involved. 
A more revealing definition of the "crucial issue" would 
be : Is picketing by an unwanted union whieh represents none, 
or less tl1an a majority, of the employes in the picketed shop, 
lawful when the objective of the picketing is to coerce the em-
ployer to himself join the union and in turn to coerce his 
employes to join it' 
Another "crucial issue," undefined by the majority but 
actual1y disposed of by them, is: Shall this court refuse to 
apply tlle Cartwright Act1 to price-fixing agreements among 
employers, and among employers and unions, in cases wherein 
the otherwise illegal agreement is demanded by a labor union 
in order to prevent the proprietors of either partially or ex-
clusively self-owned and serviced barber shops from competing 
on a price basis either among themselves or with any union 
shops Y An ancillary question is: Shall this court, without 
statutor~' authorization, differentiate between the types of 
husiness activity in which it will give effect to the Cartwright 
A('t T The holdings of the majority on these, and on even more 
fundamental, issues and my reasons for disagreement are 
hereinafter stated. 
At the outset I wish to make it altogether clear that tllC 
grounds on which I challenge the majority do not involve any 
pro-labor or anti-labor factionalism. Chavez v. Sa.rgent (1959), 
52 CIl1.2d 162 [339 P.2d 801]-whieh in this case as well as in 
Petri is the principal target for the majority's attaek-was 
not an anti-organized labor decision. It did not overrule a 
:-;in;:de previous decision of this eourt. It did not strike down 
or refuse to enforce any statute of California. A reading of 
the majority opinion in the Chavez case will demonstrate that 
'Stats. 190i, ch. 530, p. 984 et seq., amended Stats. 1909, ch. 362, p. 
r,93 et seq.; lee also, for codification of statutes prost'ribing or regulating 
('ontraC'ts in restraint of trade, Bus. & Prof. Code, ~ 16600 et seq., and 
c'oml,inations in restraint of trade, Bus. & Prof~ Code, ~ 16iOO ct seC). 
(Stats. 194], eh. u26, p. 1834 et seq.). 
) 
) 
890 MESSNER t'. J OURNEYlIlEX DARBERS ETC, 
IN'TERN4TIONAL UNION 
[53 C.2d 
it staunchly def('nds the statutory proscription of yellow dog 
contracts, that it faithfully upholds the statutorily defined 
rights of workmen to self-organization and to collectivc bar-
gaining and to union security contracts; likewise it sustains 
the use of labor's classic weapons-the strikc and peaceful 
pickcting-for all lawful objectives. The quarrel with my 
asso'ciates is on a more fundamental basis. It is on four basic 
points: 
1. The new majority have refused rcasonable respect for the 
doctrine of stare decisis. (See Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Auto-
motive Employees, etc., Local No. 88 (1960), st/.pra, ante, 
pp. 455, 475.) 
2. They have refused to abide by the elementary principle 
tllat reviewing courts will not find facts contrary to those 
found by the trial court on substantially COllflicting evidence. 
(See Petri dissent, ante, pp. 475,486-491, where the evidence 
in that case relative to the issue of the Association of Pctri 
employees as an independent or a eompanr union is care-
fully reviewed and shown to be sufficient to support the 
trial court's implied findings. It may also be lloted that the 
three justices of the District Court of Appeal who had pre-
viously reviewed the trial court's decision (1959, Cal.App.), 
340 P.2d 731, as well as three justices of this court recognized 
the substantiality and sufficiency of the evidence upon which 
the trial judge acted.) 2 
-Familiar rules for the guidance of a reviewing court in passing upon 
the question whether the evidence supports tIle detennination of the trier 
of fact that the situation presented to him does or does not constitute a 
law·MfiuC'd opernth-e fact (e.g., in Petri, the c1l1plo~-cr '8 intcrfcren('e with 
a union; in the next quoted opinion, an injury" arising out of and in the 
course of employment") are stated in Cardillo v. Liberty M111ual 1M. 
CO. (1947), 330 U.S. 469, 477·478 [6; S.Ct. 801, 806-807, 91 L.Ed. 
1028], as follows: "In detcnnining [whctller the legally operative 
ultimate fact exist.ed, the trier of fact] ... must ne('e~sari1y draw an 
inference from what he has found to be the basic facts. . . . If sup· 
ported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law, the ... inference 
[of the operative fact by the finder] ... is eonclush'e. No reyiewing 
court can then set aside that inference because the opposite one is 
thought to be more reasonable; nor ean the oppo~ite inf('r('ll('e bl:' suhst.i· 
tuted by the court because of a belief that the one ehosen by the r finder] 
•.. is factually questionable. [Citations.] 
"It matters not that the basic facts from which tIle [finder] •.. 
draws t.his inference are undisputed rather than controyerted. L Citation.] 
It is likewise immaterial that the faets pcrmit tIle drawing of di-rcrse 
inferences. The [trier of fact] •.. alone is charged with tIle dut.y of 
initially selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and his 
('hoice, if otberwise sustainable, may not be disturbed by a reYiewing 
court. [Citation.] Moreover, the fact. tbat the inference ... involves an 
application of a broad statutory tenn or pbrase to a specific set of facts 
) 
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3. The new majority have refused to uphold and apply the 
plain language of our basic labor relations statutes (Lab. 
Code, § 923, and related sections, all quoted and upheld in 
Chavez v. Sargent, supra, pp. 179-182, 186, 190, 201-203 of 
52 Ca1.2d). Since section 923 is unambiguous, is not uneon· 
stitutional, and has not been repealed, California is faced with 
a peculiar conflict of laws: On one hand, the above cited 
statute and implementing decisions; on the other hand, the 
Petri case and today's decision. Such conflict, active or 
potential, and productive of litigation, is likely to be a con-
tinuing one unless and until the majority yield to the statutes 
or the latter are amended to conform to the views of the 
majority. 
4. In today's ease the majority refuse to apply the Cart. 
wright Act. To reach the result announced they disregard, 
without expressly disavowing, the principle declared by the 
same author in Spcegle v. Board of F'i"e Underwriters (1946), 
29 Ca1.2d 34, 44 (172 P.2d 867], that "The public interest 
requires free competition so that prices be not dependent 
upon an understanding among suppliers of any given com· 
modity but upon the interplay of the economic forces of 
supply and demand." 
The actions of the majority in Petri as to points 1, 2 and 3 
above enumerated, have been disturbing to me as a lawyer and 
judge. Their action today, regrettably and regardless of the 
fact, appears to lend further credence to the fears of eminent 
('ol1llscl implicit in tIle following excerpt from their respect~ 
full~' and earnestly urged petition for reconsideration by this 
court of its decision in Petri: "The overturning of Chavez 
and Retail Clcrks by the present majority, within a few 
months after those cases were decided, has created confusion 
110t only within the legal profession but also in labor-manage· 
ment relations and among the public generally. The disposi-
tion of those cases so soon after they were decided (less than 
nine months] raises a serious question as to whether in Cali-
fornia we are a government of men rather than of laws." 
gives rise to no greater scope of judicial review. [Citations.] Even if 
such an inference be considered more legal than factual in nature, the 
reviewing court's function is exhausted when it becomes evident that the 
I"finder's] .•• choice has substantial roots in the evidence and is not 
forbidden by the law." 
'I'he foregoing rules are normally recognized and followed by this court 
as well as the high federal court. (Ham.ilton v. Pacific Bleo. By. Co. 
(1939), 12 Cal.2d 598, 602 [5] [86 P.2d 829].) . 
) 
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A comment in 47 Ca1.L.Rf'v. 905, 916, whil'h cOlH:erlled 
Garmon, Chavez, and Rrtail Clerk>;' Union anu "'hich was 
prepareu before the Petri deei>;ioll, predicted that "In a field 
as ('ontroversial as labor relations, future devclopmcnts are 
apt to be dependent on political fortunes and chan~cs in the 
personnel of the courts"; less accurate was its predidion that 
"It would seem, however, that at least the holdings of Chat·cz 
and Retails Clerks' Union will stand."3 
Further grave, constructive and merited criticism of the 
action of the eourt in Petri appears in the brief of amici 
curiae in support of respondent's request for a reconsidera-
tion of that decision: "The consequences of the dicta in the 
Court's opinion as to Section 923 and Garmon are serious 
and far-reaching. At a time when national policy banning 
stranger picketing has been recently affirmed and strengthened, 
the Court's opinion sets California's small enterprises on a 
different path. The opinion condones what has c~'nically been 
termed 'vertical organizing', and does so despite the plain 
words of a plain statute. We believe that such a result should 
not be reached at all, but particularly should not be reached 
in a case wherein the issue is not squarely presented for 
decision. " 
Professor Bernard D. Meltzer of the University of Chicago 
Law School has pertinently said (Recognition-Orgallizationa.l 
"The fact that the Petri opinion was filed less than nine months after 
Chavez brings to mind the protests of Mr. Justice Roberts in llfahnich v. 
Sout/lcrn S. S. Co. (1944), 321 U.S. 96, 112·113 [64 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed. 
!i61]: "The evil resulting from overruling earlier considered d('cisions 
must be evident. In the present ease, the court below naturnlly felt 
bound to follow and apply the law as clearly announced by this court. 
If litigants and lower federal courts are not to do so, the law becomes 
not II chnrt to govern conduct but a game of chance; instead of settling 
rights and liabilities it unsettles them. Counsel and parties will bring 
and prosecute actions in the teeth of the decisions that Bueh actions are 
not maintainable on the not improbable cllance that the asserted rule will 
be thrown overboard. Defendants will not know whether to litignte or to 
s('ttle for they will haye no assurance that a declared rule will be fol· 
lowed. But the more deplorable consequence will inevitably be that the 
Ildministration of justice will fall into disrepute." And again in Sm.it" 
'T. Allwright (1944), 3~1 U.S. 649, 666, 669 [64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987, 
1.;1 A.L.R. 1110]: The "policy of the court freely to disregard and to 
overrule considered decisions .•• indicates an intolerance for what those 
wIlD have composed this court in the past have conscientiously om1 delib· 
erately concluded, and involves an assumption that knowledge lind wisdom 
reside in us which was denied to our predecessors. • . . 
"The reason for my concern iB that the instant decision, overruling 
that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this 
tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this 
day and train only." 
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Pickefing ancl Right-fa-Work Laws (1958), 9 Labor Law 
Journ. 55, 58), concerning the Taft-Hartley (pre-1959) Act, 
"Although the statutory scheme involves a limitation on 
the freedom of a dissenting minority, this limitation seems 
justifiable on two grounds: First, it is necessary for orderly 
collective bargaining, which has important values. Secondly, 
the requirement that the bargaining agent have the support 
of the uncoerced majority makes his authority consistent 
with the generally accepted principles that the government 
of political or private groups should depend on the consent 
by a majority of those governed. 
"There are those who would repudiate the requirement 
of majority support on the ground that a union, at least if 
it represents a substantial segment of an industry, is auto-
matically entitled to the worker's allegiance and support. J 
find this argument unacceptable for several reasons: First 
it ignores the fact that the value of· collective bargaining both 
to the enterprise and to the employees depends on consent, 
by the employees affected, to the bargaining agent's role 
and to the agreement he has negotiated. Majority support, 
although it is not sufficient, is generally necessary, for SUdl 
consent. For the purpose of determining the existence of 
such support, the 'industry' is an abstraction far removed 
from the employee's interest, which is generally eentered in 
the plant or the enterprise which employs him. Accordingly, 
the plant or the enterprise and not the industry appears in 
general to be the largest unit which can be appropriately 
used in determining whether the necessary majority support 
exists. Secondly, the use of the smallest possible unit, eon-
sistent with orderly and stable collective bargaining, will 
minimize the need for subordinating the preferences of larlXc 
and concentrated minorities to the requirements of majority 
rule. Minimizing the coercion of such minorities is still an 
important value in our society, despite the expansion of in-
stitutional arrangements which promote the subordination of 
the interests of individuals and minorities to those of larl!<'r 
groups. For these reasons, I believe that tIle architects of the 
federal policy were wise in rejecting the notion that unionR, 
like the state, are entitled to any automatic allegiance. . . . 
"It is, I believe, fair t.o assume that most unorganized 
employers want to stay that way. Furthermore, the inherent 
limitations of the law, as well a!'! bad administration, permit 
some employers, by unlawful coercion, to deny to unions thc 
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bargaining status which they would have otherwise aellicv('o. 
But these considerations, troublesome as they are, 0.0 not 
warrant the indiscriminate use of coercive picketing against 
lawful as well as lawless employers and their employef>s." 
The more specific reasons for my disagreement with the 
holding of the majority that, consonant with California law, 
an "outside" labor union can properly put economic pres-
sure on an employer to compel him to execute a closed or 
union shop agreement although none of his employes wish 
to join or be represented by the union, are stated in the major-
ity opinions in Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Tmdes C01wcil 
(1958), 49 Cal.2d 595 [320 P.2d 473] ; Chavez v. Sargcnt 
(1959), supra, 52 Ca1.2d 162; and Retail Clerks' U11ion v. 
Superior Court (1959), 52 Ca1.2d 222 [339 P.2d 839] ; and 
the dissenting opinion in Petri Clconers, Inc. v. Automotivc 
Employees, etc. Local No. BB (1960), supra, ante, pp. 455, 
475. Section 923 of the Labor Code says that "the individual 
workman ... shall be free from the interference, restraint, 
or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the 
designation of . . . [collective bargaining] representatives or 
in self-organization . . ." The majority in Petri and in this 
case, in effect, add to the quoted clear and explicit statutory 
language an exception or proviso which, in my opinion, is 
not only beyond the proper function of a court but which 
does not promote the interests of either individual WOrkn1l'1l 
or of organized labor. It seems to me that, when all or a 
majority of the subject employes of a particular employ('r 
choose not to join a union, the spirit and language of section 
923 are as much violated if the employer coerces them to do 
so because of the pressure of concerted union activity, such 
as peaceful picketing, as the;\' would be if the employer acted 
at the mere suggestion of a single representative of the union, 
or upon his own initiativc. 
Because of the above noted conflict between the statutory 
law (Lab. Code, § 923, and related sections, as upheld and 
applied in the rases last hereinabove cited) and the decisional 
law declared in Petri and in this rase, it has appeared de-
sirable to comprehensively research the pertinent statutes 
and decisions of other jurisdirtions to ascertain which view 
the weight of authority supports. The sources examined are 
listrd in appropriately identifi('d footnotes and tIle ronrlu-
sions reached are stated in th(' tpxt which follows. 
The view that it is unlawful for union members to engage 
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in peaceful but coercive picketing of the premises of an em-
ployer w}lOse employes do not wish to join the union, for 
the purpose of compelling the employer to agree to, and in 
his turn to then compel, a closed or union shop, is not, as 
some of amici curiae supporting the defendant barbers' union 
here suggest, a strange and shocking aberration. On the 
contrary such is the view of most of the states today, and 
the vie,~' of our national government to some as yet unclearly 
defined extent (see N.L.R.B. v. Drivers U11ion Local 639 
(1960), 362 U.S. 274 [80 8.0t. 706, 4 L.Ed.2d 710J 
[28 Law Week 4217J ; National Labor :Management Relations 
Act, as amended 1959, § 8 (b) (7» ; and in years recently past 
state courts (when they were not precluded on the facts of 
the particular case by federal preemption) often enjoined 
such picketing. 
In a number of states it has been held that provisions of 
a state statute or constitution similar to section 923 of our 
Labor Oode make the object of such picketing unlawfu1.4 
"Alabama: The following eases consider title 26. Code. ~ 383 (" Every 
person shall be free to join or refrain from joining any labor organiza· 
tion •.. and in the exercise of such freedom shall be free from inter-
ference") prior to Alabama's enactment of a "right-to-work" statute: 
A closed or union shop was a lawful object of picketing where the picket-
ing union represented a majority of the employes (Hotel 4" Restaurant 
Employees v. Greenwood (1947). 249 Ala. 265 [30 So.2d 696, 703 [12], 
70:) [17]]), but picketing for such object by a minority union could be 
enjoined (Klibanoff v. Tri·Cities Retail Cl. Union (1953), 258 Ala. 479 
[64 So.2d 393, 398]). 
Colorado: Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Green (1948), 119 Colo. 92 
[200 P.2d 924, 930-931], affirming injunction of picketing to compel an 
employer to ent.er into an "all-union contract" after a majority of his 
employes had voted against union representation; by executing such a 
contract the employer would have committed the unfair labor practices 
of interfering with employes' right to organize or remain unorganized 
(§ 80-5-6(1) (a» and encouraging or discouraging membership in a labor 
organization, except where the employer enters into an "all-union" 
agreement as authorized by the provisions (§ 80-5-6(1)(c» of the 
compr('llcnsh-e Lahor Pell~e Act (Rev. Stats., ch. 80, art. 5, §§ 1-22, 
enacted in 1943). See also Building Const. Tr. C01Lncil v. American 
Bldrs_, Inc. (1959). -- Colo. -- [337 P.2d 953, 955-956]. 
Connecticut: Lat'ery's Main Street Grill v. Hotel 4" Restaurant Emp. 
(1959), 146 Conn. 93 [147 A.2d 902, 905-906 [2-4)]; Kenmike Theatre 
v. Moving Picture Operators (1952), 139 Conn. 95 [90 A.2d 881, 882-
883). Connecticut lIas a comprehensive Labor Relations Act (Gen. Stats., 
1949, H 7388-7399). 
Idaho: Poffenroth v. Culinary Workel'S Union (1951), 71 Idaho 412 
[232 P_2d 968, 969]; J. J. Newberry Co. v. Retail Clerks International 
.du·n (1956), 78 Idaho 85 [298 P.2d 375, 379 [4]), reversed because of 
federal preemption, 352 U.S. 987. The Idaho Code contains provisions 
(§§ 44-701. 44-702) like sections 923 and 921 of our Labor Code. to-
I 
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Some of these states mentioned in footnote 4 do and some do 
not have more or less detailed labor relations aets and agencies 
to administer them; in any event, the courts of such states 
gether with other provisions like those of tile N orris·La Guardia Act 
which were omitted from our code. 
Indiana (prior to enactment of a "right· to-work" law): Roth v. 
Local Union No. HOD (1939), 216 Ind. 363, 371 [24 N.E.2d 280, 282-283 
[5, 6]], applying Acts 1933, ch. 12, § 2 (Burns' Ann. Stat., 1933, ~ 40-
502), a declaration of policy like section 9~3 of our Labor Code, in tlIe 
In(liana anti-injunction act. 
Kansas (prior to 1958 "riglIt-to-work" amendment to state Constitu-
tion): Bin.der v. Construction etc. Union (1957), 181 Kan. 799 [317 
P.2d 371, 376·378 [2,4]], applying G.B. 1949, § 44-803 (like section 923 
of our Labor Code, and also stating the right of employes "to refrain 
from ... such activities"), G.B. 1955, ~ 44-808 (employer coercion of 
employes in tlIe exercise of their rights under section 44-803 unlawful), 
G.S. 1955, § 44-809 (12) (such coercion of employes by "any person" 
unlawful). 
Kentucky: Blur Boar Cafeteria Co. v. Hotel 4- Re.~taurant Employees 
etc. Union (19,32), -- K~·. -- 12;'4 S.W.2d 33;;' 338-339 [2]], eert. 
den. 346 U.B. 834 [74 S.Ct. 41, 98 L.Ed. 3571: Hotel 4- Restaurant E'rn-
pZoyee8 etc. Union v. Lambert (1953), -- (Ky_App.) -- 258 S.W.2d 
694 [1], applying KRS 336.130 (Acts Gen. Assembly, 1940, ch. 105), 
which was rather like section 923 of our Labor Code. 
Maine: Pappas v. Stacey (1955), 151 Me. 36 [116 A.2d 497, 499-501 
[3]], appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 870 [76 S.Ct. 117, 100 L_Ed. 770], 
applying P.L. 1941, ch. 292 (R.B., cb. 30, § 15), like California Labor 
Code, section 923. 
Massachusetts: Ann. Laws, ch. 150A, is a comprehensive Labor Rela-
tions Act. The employer's compliance with a closed shop agreement 
between the employer and one not certified as the representative of hiB 
employes pursuant to the act would be an unfair labor practice and 
picketing to enforce such compliance can be enjoined. (R. H. White Co. 
v. Murphy (1942), 310 Mass. 510 [38 N.E.2d 685, 690 [9, 10], 691].) 
Apart from t.he aet closed shop agreements voluntarily made have "al-
ways" been recognized and enforced. But a strike for a closed shop" is 
for an unlawful labor objective" and peaceful picketing for sucII pur-
pose can be enjoined. (Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern (1943), 313 Mass. 
385 [48 N.E.2d 1, 3-4, 5].) 
Michigan: Way Baking Co. v. Teamsters 4' Tf'1Ick Drivers (1953),335 
Mich. 478 [56 N.W.2d 357, 362 [4, 5]], cert. den. 345 U.S. 957 [73 S.Ct_ 
939, 97 L.Ed. 1378], applying Stats. Ann., ~ 17.454(18) (C.L. 1948, 
§ 423.17, as amended by P.A. 1949, No. 230), the state Labor Relations 
Act, which makes it unlawful for any person "by force or unlawful 
threats to ... attempt to force any person to become or remain a 
member of a labor organization, or ..• to refrain from engaging in 
employment.' , 
Minnesota: By StatB. Ann., ch. 179, as amended, a comprehensive 
labor relations statute, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer 
to sign a closed shop contract without the consent of his employes (Nemo 
v. Local etc. Board (1949), 227 Minn. 263 [35 N.W.2d 337, 341]) and 
apparently picketing to induce such practice could be enjoined (see 
Starr v. Cooks etc. Union (1955),244 Minn. 558 [70 N.W_2d 873, 879]). 
Missouri.: BelZerive Country Club. v. McVey (1955), 365 Mo. 477 [284 
S.W.2d 492, 500 [2]] ["the right guaranteed to employees by Art. I, 
Sec. 29, Mo. Const. 1945, 'to organize and to bargain collectively through 
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have concluded, they can and should provide a remedy against 
the statutory or constitutional violation, whether such remedy 
is the enforcement of a commission's cease and desist order 
representatives of their own choosing' is a free choice, uncoerced by 
management ••. "]; Swift I Company v. Doe (1958), -- Mo. --
t3ll S.W.2d 15, 21 [3)]. 
~ew Jersey-: N.J. Const., 1947, art I, par. 19, provides, "Persons in 
private employment shall have the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively." This provision is not implemented by statute, but by the courts. 
(Independent D.W. Union v. Milk Drivers etc. Local No. 680 (1959),30 
X.J. 173 [1;;2 A.2d 331, 336 [2], 336-337 13,4]] [subject type of picket-
ing by stranger union enjoined at suit of freely organized independent 
union whicll had been selected as bargaining agent by employes at a 
secret election conducted by a "Fair Ballot Association"; the court 
rejects defendant union's contention that "the judiciary [should] be 
inert because it cannot pro.ide a mechanism equal to the task of formu-
lating and effectuating a fair pattern of labor-management relations"]; 
td. (1958), 49 N.J. Super. 78 [139 A.2d 134]; ro. (1956), 23 N.J. 85 
112; A.2d 8li!l, 874-8;:") I:: n, 8;5-876 [5,6] 1 r" }'reedom of choice in 
selecting one's bargaining ng-mt is the very essence of collective bargain. 
ing" and" [I)f the proted ion afforded to insure unfettered organiza-
tional processes by our Const itution is to have assistance ... , the will 
of the majority may not be undermined by picketing where the sole object 
is economic duress upon the employer and the employees"].) 
New York: Goodwill-s, Inc. Y. 1Iagcdorn (1951), 303 N.Y. SOO [101 
N.E.2d 697, 3:! A.L.R.2tl 10l!I, 1021] [the Goodwins holding as to 
federal preemption no douht could not stand today, but such holding is 
not pertinent to our present consideration]; Wood v. O'Grady (1954), 
307 N.Y. 532, 539-540 1122 N.E.2d 386]; Pleasant Valley Packing Co. 
v. Talarico (1958),5 N.Y.2d 40 [152 N.E.2d 505, 507 [1)]. N. Y. Laws, 
Ann., 1948, tit. 30, art. 20, ~ 700 et scq., is a comprehcnsi'l'e Labor Rela-
tions Act. 
Pcnns~"lnllli:1: lFinan/; Y. Chester <1" Delau·arc etc. Union (1948), 360 
Pa.48 r60 A.2d ~], ~3 r3. 41]; Sa?lsom House Enterprises v. Traiters etc. 
Union (1955),382 Pa. 476 [115 A.2d 746, 749 [3]], cert. den., 350 U.S. 
896 [76 S.Ct. 155, 100 L.Ed. 788]; School District v. Intcrnational Broth-
er1100d (1958), 316 Pa. 408 [145 A.2d 258, 262]. Pa. Stats. Ann., tit. 
43, 9 211.1-211.12, is a comprchensive Labor Relations Act. 
Washington: Gazzam v. Building Service Employees Union (1948),29 
Wash.2d 488 [188 P.2d 97, 104, 11 A.L.R.2d 1330), (19-19), 34 Wash. 
2d 38 [207 P.2d 699], affirmed, Building Service Union v. GazzG'TI1 
(1950), 339 U.S. 532, 538-539 [70 S.Ct. 784, 94 L.Ed. 1045], applying 
an anti-injunction law like t.hat of Indiana, supra, and also stating that 
stranger recognitional pickp.ting 'l'iolated "rules of common law"; Audu-
bon Homcs Y. SpoJ.;ane B!dg. etc. Council (1956), 49 Wash.2d 145 [298 
P.2d 1112, 1115 [1-3]], cert.. den., 354 U.S. 942 [77 s.et. 1392, 1 L.Ed. 
2d 1536]. 
Wisconsin: r ogt, Inc. v. International Bj·othcr1100il of Teamsters 
(1956), 270 Wis. 315 r74 N.W.2d 749, 753 [5], 755 [6]), affirmed, 
Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc. (1957), 354 U.S. 284, 294 [77 S.Ct. 1166, 
1 L.Ed.2d 1347]. Wisconsin's comprehensive Employment Peace Act 
provides (Stat. Ann., 9111.06(2) (b») that it is an unfair labor practice 
and against public policy for an employe individually or in concert with 
others "To coerce •.• any employcr to interfere with any of his 
employes in the enjoyment of their legal rights, ineluding those guaran-
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as spelled out by statute or, in the absence of statute, a 
t~'pi('al ('xer(·ise of the POWl'!' or E'quity to enjoin against 
threatened wrongful infiietiol1 of irl'rparable injury. 
SOllle states haY(' statutes whi('h directly outlaw pi('keting 
by a minority or strallger union,5 and in a few states judi-
teed IJi section 111.04"; the latter section guarantees to employes the 
right of self-organization, collective bargaining through representatives 
of their own choosing, concerted lawful acth'ity, and the right to refrain 
from t1lly such activities. 
Wyoming: Hagen v. Culinary Workers Alliance Local No. SS'l (1952), 
70 Wyo. 165 [246 P.2d 778, 788 [6]], applying tile Wyoming "Little 
Norris-LaGuardia Act," W.C.S., § 5-1-501, like the Indiana and Wash-
ington statut('s, sllpra. 
"Arizona (also lms a "right-to-work" law): Rev. Stat. Ann., ch. 8, 
§ 23-1322: "It shall be unlawful for any labor organization to picket any 
establishment unless there exists between the employer and the majority 
of employees of such establishment a bona fide dispute regarding wages 
or working conditions." 
Colorado: Section 6(2) (e) of the Labor Peace Act (Rev. Stats., ch. 80, 
art. 5, §§ 1-22) made a strike vote by a majority of the employes of the 
subject employer a condition precedent of picketing, and section 7 (2) 
provided that the strike vote be taken" as is provided in this act." These 
sections were held inoperative because the only provision in "this act" 
for a strike vote was in section 20, which in turn was held unconstitu-
tional because it required incorporation of unions. (A1llerican Federation 
of Labor v. R('illy (1944), 113 Colo. 90 [155 P.2d 145, 150 [9, 10], 160 
A.L.R. 873].) 
Hawaii: Rev. Laws, 1955, ch. 90, is a comprehensive Employment 
Relations Act. Section 90-8(e) provides that it is an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employe "To cooperate in engaging in, promoting or inducing 
picketing (not constituting an exercise of constitutionally guaranteed 
freedom of speech) •.. unless a majority in a collective bargaining unit 
of t he eDlplo~-ees of an employer against whom such acts are primarily 
direeted have voted by secret ballot to call a strike." 
Minnesota: Stat. Ann., ~ 179.11 (4) provides that it is an uufair labor 
practice "For any person to picket or cause to be picketed a place of 
employment of which place the person is not an employee while a strike 
is in progress affecting the place of employment, unless the majority of 
persons engaged in picketing the place of employment at these times are 
employees of the place of employment." 
lIIontana has a rather unusual statute (Rev. Code Ann., § 41-1801; 
L. 1959, cll. }(iO, § 1) which provides that" a sole proprietor or a member 
of a partnership consisting of not more than two partners who own a 
retail or amusement establishment and the members of his immediate 
family shull 113ve the right to do any work in his place of business with-
out interference by any union or any member thereof." 
Oregon: Rey. Stats., 1953, ch. 662, §~ .610 through .790, a comprehen-
sh'e labor code, specifically provides (§ .750) that "It shall be unlawful 
for any person directly or indirectly to ... coerce ... any employee 
in tile exercise of said employee '8 free choice in selecting or rejecting a 
labor organization as the representative of employees for the p~rpose of 
collective bargaining, or ... to coerce ... any employer or employee 
because employees of said employer . . . h(1\'e not selected a labor organ-
ization as their representative for said purpose_ The word 'coeree' in-
cludes picketing." The constitutionality of this provision was upheld in 
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cially declared public policy forbids recognitional picketing 
by such a union.6 In the many states which have made the 
union shop illegal by "right-to-work" statutes,7 picketing to 
compel exeeution of a union shop contract is of course for 
an unlawful object. The states which uphold the legality of 
Gilbertson v. Culinary Alliance 4' Bartenders' Union (1955), 204 Ore. 
326 [282 P.2,1 632, 6;;2·653 [15·18]]. 
Pennsyi\"ania: The state Labor Relations Act (Act of 1947, No. 484) 
pro\"ided tha~ it is a union unfair labor practice for a labor organization 
or employ<'s •• To picket or cause to be picketed a place of employment 
1,y a perRoll . . . who is not • • • an employee . • • of the plaee of 
employment." (Purdon's Stats. Ann., tit. 43, ~ 211.6(2) (d).) This 
Rtatule \";:1' h~ld :m ull('onstitl1tionnl restraint on freedom of speech be-
cause its brond prohibition of picketing by nonemployes "leaves room 
for no exceptions based upon the lawfulness of the purpose of the pieket-
ing, its peaceful character, or the circumstances tbat tbe picketers have 
a legitimate economic interest to advance thereby." (Pennsylvania 
I,abor Relations Board v. Chester 6" Dc!_ etc. Union (1949),361 Pa.246 
[64 A.2d S3~. 841 [3]].) 
Tex:ls (whiell has a "rigbt-to-work" law) also sought to narrowly 
restrict l'eac·eful picketing by the following provisions of Vernon's Ann. 
Ch·. Stat., art. 1>154f: "It shall be unlawful for any person •.• to •.• 
lmrticipatc in, aid or abet .•. sccondary picketing ••• as those terms 
are defined herein"; i.e., "the act of establishing a picket ..• near the 
premises of any employer where no labor llispute, as that term is defined 
in this Act, exi~ts between such employer and his employees ..•• The 
term 'lnhor dispute' is limit.ed to ... any controversy between an em-
ployer and the majority of his employees concerning wages, hours or 
conditions of employment; provided that if any of the employees are 
mem!'ers of n labor union, a controversy between such employer and a 
lIlajority of til" employees belonging to such union, concerning wages, 
hours or conuitions of employment, shall be deemed, as to the employee 
members onl~' of snell union, a labor dispute within the meaning of this 
Ailt." In Illtenlatienal Union of Operating Engineers v. Cox (1949), 
148 Tex. 42 r~]!J S.W.:!d 787,793 [10-12]], it was held that the fore-
going stat.utory definitions were so narrow as to constitute an unconsti-
tutional depriyation of free speedl, but the right to impose reasonable 
r~stri('tiolls 011 pcaceful picketing was recognized. 
Wis('on"in: Stat. Ann., § 111.06(2) (e), like the Hawaii statute, supra. 
·X~\\' Hnmpshire (semble): White Mt. F"cezer Co. v. Murphy (1917), 
78 N.H. 311S [101 A. 3;;7, 361 [12], 362 [13]]. 
Illinois: Bit2'cr JTofor Co. v. Loral 604 (1953),349 Ill.App. ·283 [110 
N.E.!!d 6;4, 6i7 [4]]. 
Ohio: Clul<'alcR Y. Royalty (1956),164 Ohio St. 214 [129 N.E.2d 823, 
S28 [4]], errt den., 3;;] U.S. 926 [76 S.Ct. 781, 100 L.Ed. 1456]. 
Wn~hjllgtoll: Ga::::am Y. Bllilding Service Employees Union (1948), 
/II/pTa, 2!J W:\~h.2d 48S 11SS P.2d 97, 104], holds that stranger recogni-
tionol pirhting "iolated tllC "rommon law" as well as the statute reo 
ferred to ill footnotc 4, III/pra. 
'Alnh:tmo: Title :;(1, ('ode, ~ 375(2), (3); see A/abanla HighlJ'ay Ex-
P'·CS •• , Inc. Y. I.oral 61::! (]!);i9) , 26R Ala. 392 [108 So.2d 350, 356]. 
Arizona: 11146 amendment to Ariz. Const. (implemented by Ariz. 
Session Lnws, l!lH. cll. 81, p. 173); upheld in American Federation of 
Labor Y. Aml/'jcan So.,71 4' Dool' Co. (11l48), 67 Ariz. 20 L189 P.2d 912], 
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recognitional picketing to compel an employer to force a union 
shop upon an unwilling majority of his employes are few.s 
In situations preempted to the jurisdiction of the National 
affirmed, American Federation 01 Labor v. American Bash Co. (1949), 
335 U.S. 538 [69 S.Ct. 258, 93 L.Ed. 222, 6 A.L.R.2d 481]. 
Arkansas: Ark. Const., Amendment 34; Acts of Ark., 1947, Act No. 
101; Bellv. Taylor (1950),217 Ark. 953 [235 S.W.2d 45, 49 [2]]. 
Florida: Fla. Const. Dec!. of Rights, § 12, as amended, 1944; Local 
No. f34, etc. v. Henley 4" Beckwith, Inc. (1953, :I!'la.), 66 So.2d 818, 820. 
Georgia: Laws, 1947, No. 140 (Code Ann. 54-804, 66-9906); Power. 
v. Courson (1957), 213 Ga. 20 [96 S.E.2d 577]. 
Indiana: Acts 1957, ch. 19 (Bums' Ann. Stats. (1957 Supp) , § 40· 
2701 et seq.); see Smith v. General Motors Corp. (1957), 128 Ind.App. 
310 [143 N.E.2d 441, 449 [7]]. 
Iowa: Laws, 1947, ch. 296 (Code Ann., § 736A.1 et seq.). 
Kansas: Kan. Const., art. 15, § 12 (adopted 1958). 
Louisiana: The general "right·to-work" law (LSA·R.S. 23: 881-
23:888; see Piegts v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters (1955), 228 La. 131 
[81 So.2d 835, 838 [1, 2]]) was repealed by Laws 1956, Act 16. Laws 
1956, Act 397, is a "right-to-work" law for agricultural workers. 
Mississippi: Code Ann., § 6984.5 (Laws, 1954, ch. 249, §§ 1, 2). 
Nebraska: Neb. Const., art. XV, §§ 13, 14, 15, adopted in 1946, upheld 
in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron 4" Metal Co. 
(1948), 149 Neb. 507 [31 N.W.2d 477], affirmed, Lincoln Union v. 
Northwestern Co. (1949), 335 U.S. 525 [69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212, 6 
A.L.R.2d 473]. 
Nevada: Stats. 1953, eh. 1; Building Trades Council v. Bonito (1955), 
71 Nev. 84 [280 P.2d 295, 297 [3]). 
North Carolina: N.C. Session Laws, 1947, ch. 328, upheld in State v. 
Whitaker (1947),228 N.C. 352 [45 S.E.2d 860], affirmed, Lincoln Union 
v. Northwestern Co. and Whitaker v. North Carolina (1949), 335 U.S. 
525 [69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212, 6 A.L.R.2d 473]. 
North Dakota: NDRC, 1949 Supp., § 34-0901; NDRC, 1953 Supp., 
§ 34-0114; Minor v. Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council (1956), -- N.D. 
- [75 N.W.2d 139, 149 [12]]. 
South Carolina: Code, §§ 40-46 tllrough 40-46.11 (enaeted 1954). 
South Dakota: Const., art. VI, § 2, as amended 1946; Laws, 1947, ch. 
92, ~§ 1·3; Baumgartner's Electric Const. Co. v. DeVries (1958), --
S.D. - [91 N.W.2d 663, 672·673 [9]). 
Tennessee: Public Acts, 1947, eh. 36 (T.C.A. § 50-209); Finchum Steel 
Erection Corp. v. Local Union 884 (1957), 202 Tenn. 580 [308 S.W.2d 
381]; Farnsworth 4" Chambers Co. v. Local Union 429 (1957),201 Tenn. 
329 [299 S.W.2d 8, 11 [9]], reversed because of federal preemption, 353 
U.S. 969 [77 S.Ct. 1051, 1 L.Ed.2d 916]. 
Texas: Laws 1947, eh. 74 (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St., art. 5207a); 
Local Union No. 324 v. Upshur-Bural Elec. Co-op Corp. (1933, Tex.Civ. 
App.) 261 S.W.2d 484, 485 [3]. 
Utah: Code Ann. §§ 34·16-1 through 34-16-18 (Laws 1955, ch. 54). 
Virginia: Acts of Assembly, 1947, ch. 2, upheld in Plu'l1lbers Union v. 
Graham (1953), 345 U.S. 192, 200-201 [73 S.Ct. 585, 97 L.Ed. 946]. 
"New Mexico: Romero v. Journeymen Barbers (1938), 63 N.M. 443 
[321 P.2d 628, 629], upholds such picketing as a court· declared rule. 
Rhode Island: The comprehensive state Labor Relations Act, Gen. 
Laws, tit. 28, ch. 7 (P. L. 1941, eh. 1066) resembles the Wagner Act 
(pre-Taft-Hartley). Section 28·7·2 thereof declares the public policy 
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Labor Relations Board and the federal courts under the Taft-
Hartlpy Act,9 however, N.L.R.B. v. Drivers Union Local 639 
Acntatives of their own choosing "free from the interfN('llce, restraint 
or coercion of their employers" (~1) and provides that the nct shall not 
be construed to diminish the right of employes to engage in "lawful, 
('oncerted Ilctivities." According to Lindsey Tavern v. Hotel 4' Restau· 
rant Employee,q (1956), 85 R.I. 61 [125 A.2d 207, 209, 210 [4]], 
reeognitional picketing, "unaccompanied by coercion, duress or intimi· 
dation, is lawful, ... even if the picketing union represents no em· 
ployees of the complainant." 
West Virginia: Blossom Dairy Co. v. Internatio'llal Brotherhood 
(1942),125 W.Va. 165 [23 S.E.2d 645,649], where no statute is involved, 
holds (Syllabus 1 by thc court, p. 646 of 23 S.E.2d) that "Picketing of 
the l)lace of business of an employer by a labor union will not be en·, 
joined on the ground that it tends, or is intended, to cause the breach of 
a labor contract between such employer and another lahor organization, 
when such picketing is not otherwise unlawful." 
Nevada (prior to enaetment in 1953 of a "right·to,work" law) may 
also be mentioned here: State ex reI. Culinary v. Eighth Judicial District 
Court (1949),66 Nev. 166 [207 P.2d 990, 996·998 [10·12]], upheld the 
legality of picketing by an outside union to compel a closed shop agree· 
ment under N.C.L., § 10473 (enacted 1911), which provided that "It 
shall be unlawful for any person •.• to make .•• any agreement ••• 
by the terms of which any employee of such person, ... or any person 
about to enter the employ of such person, ... as a condition for continu-
ing or obtaining such employment, shall promise or agree not to become 
or continue ••• , or .•• to become or continue a member of a labor 
organization," and N.C.L., § 2825.31 (approved 1937), a statutory 
declaration of policy substantially, identical with section 923 of our 
Labor Code_ 
'Prior to its 1959 amendment section 8 of t.he Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947, as amended (29 U.S.C. § 158), contained among 
the proscribed unfair labor practices (largely the same as those which, 
prior to the recent majority decision in the Petri Cleaners ease were 
proscribed in California by Labor Code, see.tion 923, and related sections) 
the following which are here pertinent: 
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or 
its agents: 
"(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 7 [i.e., rights to self-organization, to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing, etc., and also to 
refrain from such activities except as the latter right may be affeeted by 
a union security agreement as authorized in section 8(a)(3)] ••• 
"(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against 
an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) [which provides that it is 
an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to 
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organ· 
ization, except that the employer call enter into a union security agree-
ment as authorized by the act] ... 
"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any 
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of 
their employment to . _ • work on any .• _ commodities or to perform 
any services, where an object thereof is: ••. (C) forcing ..• any 
employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as 
the representath-e of his employees if another labor organization has 




902 MESSNER 1' .• J()TTRXr:Y~JEX n.\HllERS ETC. 
b;TEl~XATHJl':AL rXIOX 
[53 C.2d 
(1960), supra, 362 U.S. 274 [80 S.Ct. 706, 4 L.Ed. 2d 
710] [28 Law Week 4217], has answered negatively the 
questioJl "wlldhcl' prareful pic:kt'ting by a union, whieh does 
not l'epl'esrnt a majority of the employees, to compel imme-
diate recognition as the employees' t·xtlusiye barg-aining agrlJt, 
is conduct of the union 'to restrain or coeree' thr employres ill 
the exercise of rights guaranteed in § 7, and thus an unfair 
labor practice under § 8(b) (1) (A)." The board there issuf'd 
a cease and desist order against picketing which continued 
for six months after the employes of Curtis Bros. voted in 
favor of "no union." The board prorerded under section 
8(b) (1) (A) prior to the 1959 amendment of Taft·Hartley, 
and although on oral argument to the United States Supreme 
Court counsel for the board stated that, had the case arisen 
uncler the 1959 act, the board might haye prorreded under 
section 8(b) (7) thereof,lO the majority refused to remand 
the matter for reconsidrration in the light of the new law. 
The court rrachrs its conclusion in the following manner: 
"[P. 4219 of 28 Law 'Veek.] [T]ension exists brtwerll the 
two rights of employres protected by § 7-their right to form, 
join or assist labor organizations, and their right to refrain 
from doing so .... The Board stated: 'Because the object 
of the Union's piel;:eting in this case was to force the Com-
pany to commit an art prohibited by the statute itself [that 
is, to recognize and contract with the Loral although it was 
not the chosen representatiYc of a majority of the Curtis 
Bros. employees] and directly to dcpriye the employees of 
a right expressly guaranteed to them by the same Act, there 
is no occasion here to balance rOllfiicting interests or rights.' " 
1°The 1959 act adds a new union unfair labor practice to section B(b) ; 
i.e., "(7) to picket or cause to be picketed .•. any employer where an 
object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bar· 
gain with a labor organization as the repr!'s!'ntative of his employees ..• 
unless Buch labor organization is currcntly cl'Ttifi!'d as the representative 
of Buch employees: II 
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized anotJI(.'T union and a 
question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised 
under tl,e act. 
(B) where a valid representation clection 1188 been conducted in the 
preceding 12 months. 
(0) where the picketing has been conduded without a representation 
petition being filed with the board "within a reasonable })eriod of time 
110t to exceed thirty days from the eommemem!'nt of sueh picketing, II 
with some pro,isos. 
"Nothing in this paragraph (7) al,aJl be ronstrued to pennit any act 
which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section 
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The board's conclusion, as su.mmarized by the court, was 
that "the threat to the employees' job seeurit~· whieh was 
thought to be inherent in the economic pressure directed 
against the employer ... was said to taint peaceful picketing" 
as unlawful conduct to 'restrain or coerce' which the Board 
might forbid." 
The high court's opinion continues as follows: "We first 
consider § 8 (b) (1) (A) in the light of § 13 whic·h provides, 
in substance, that the Taft-Hartley Act shall not be taken 
as restricting or expanding either the right to strike or the 
limitations or qualifications on that right, as these were undpr-
stood prior to 1947, unless 'specifically provided for' in thc 
Act itself.(11l ... [Before 1947] the full protection of the 
Norris-La Guardia Act extended to peaceful picketing by 
minority unions for recognition. [Citations.] Therefore, since 
the Board's order ... would obviously • impede' the right 
to strike it can only be sustained if such power is 'spe-
cifically provided for' in the Taft-Hartley Act, that is, in 
§ 8(b) (1) (A)." 
That section does not vest such power in the board. (P. 
4220 of 28 Law Week.) The "general standard" of section 
8(b) (1) (A) does not overlap the "rather specific" prohibi-
tions of section 8 (b) (4) . (See particularly § 8 (b) (4) (C), 
quoted supra, footnote 9.) The words "restrain or coerce" 
in section 8(b) (1) constitute "a 'restricted phrase' to be 
equated with 'threat of reprisal or force or promise of bene-
fit,' " as contrasted with the words "induce or encourage" 
in section 8 (b) (4). And the legislative history of section 
8 (b) (1) (A) as read by the high federal court does not support 
t]lC board's view. 
Finally, the court says (p. 4222 of 28 Law Week), "We 
are confirmed in our view by the action of Congress in passing 
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 
That Act goes beyond the Taft-Hartley Act to legislate a 
comprehensive code governing organizational strikes and 
picketing and draws no distinction between 'organizational' 
and 'recognitional' picketing .... Were § S(b) (1) (A) to 
,,[11 1 Section 13 provides: 
" 'Nothing in this Act, except as speeifical1y proyided for }Ierein, shall 
be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any 
way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on 
that right.' 61 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. ~ 163. 
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have the sweep contended for by the Board, the Board might 
proceed against peaceful picketing in disregard of [the safe-
guards of § 8(b) (7) of the 1959 act, quoted supra, footnotc 
10] .... Courts may properly take into account the later 
Act when a.<;ked to extend the reach of the earlier Act's vague 
language to the limits which, read literally, the words might 
permit." 
For the following reasons I cannot regard the foregoing 
decision as persuasive in its effect on the problem of state 
law which is under discussion: To me, as to three justices 
of the federal Supreme Court (p. 4223 of 28 Law Week), 
section 8(b) (7) of the 1959 federal act "seems squarely to 
cover the type of conduct involved," and that matter has 
not been fully and fairly litigated. In any event, it is a 
generally accepted view that Congress by the 1959 amend-
ments sought to curtail minority or stranger picketing for 
the purpose of causing organization "from the top." (See 
John H. Fanning, member of the NLRB, The New Taft-
Hartley Arnendme11ts (1959), 10 Labor Law Journ. 763, 765; 
HnrTY H. Rains, New York attorney, What the New Labor 
Law Means to Management (1959), 10 Labor Law Journ. 753, 
790-793; Benjamin Wyle, formerly general counsel of the 
Textile Workers' Union, now member of the Labor Arbitra-
tion Committee of the American Bar Association, The New 
Law of Picketing (1959), 10 Labor Law Journ. 889, '891, 
894.) Nor am I able to predict what view the high court 
might take had the picketing in the above case been recog-
nitionally but not organizationally effective and caused Curtis 
Bros. to violate section 8(a) (3) of the national act. Also I 
would note that the emphasis placed by the lIigh court upon 
the protection afforded the subject picketing by the Norris-
La Guardia Act prior to 1947 is not pertinent in California, 
for in 1933 our Legislature refused to pass an anti-injunction 
bill similar to that act, and instead adopted only its declara-
tion of policy (Lab. Code, § 923) and its provisions against 
yellow dog and company union activity of the employer. 
Therefore, I reiterate my opinion that the majority's con-
cept of "freedom" of self-organization "is definitely opposed 
not only to the statutes of California but also to widely ex-
pressed recent thinking in the field of labor-management-
individual workman relations" (Petri dissent, ante, p. 480). 
Giving efreet to the plain language of Labor Code, section 





Apr. 1960] MESSNER V. JOURNEYJlIEN BARBERS ETC. 905 
IJI."TERNATIONAL UNION 
[53 C.2d 873: 4 Cal.RDtr. 179. 351 P.2d 347) 
done in California prior to the Petri decision, California law 
was in harmony with that of the vast majority of the sister 
states (footnotes 4 through 8, supra) and with wllat at least 
seems to be the clear purport of sections 8(b) (7) (B) and 
8(b) (7) (C) of the federal act. In my rcsearch I have dis-
('on'red only three other states (footnote 8, supra) which 
definitely accept the view enunciated by the majority in Petri 
and reiterated today. The California statutes are, of course, 
still in our law books, and thcir clear language is still in har-
mony with the state law of the majority of states and with 
the most recent statutory developments of the federal law. 
Nevertheless, by the decree of four justices who refuse to up-
)lOld and apply that \vhich was the established statutory and 
decisional law of this state, California in intrastate matters 
is currently retrograded to that small minority of states whic·h 
persist in maintaining an ungoverned area in labor relations. 
Thus ill California large enterprises which are engaged in 
interstate commerce have at least some measure of protection 
under federal law while small businesses, despite our statutory 
law, are left to "the free [and destructive] interaction of eco-
nomic forces" (Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Auiomot-ive Employ('rs, 
etc., Local No. 88 (1960), supra, ante, pp. 469, 473) which 
is more similar to the combat of tooth and nail than to the 
operation of a governed society. 
The broad sweep of thc majority's holdings in Petri and in 
the case at bench-going far beyond the import of the succinet 
statement of "crucial issue" hereinabove quoted- requires 
from me some comment upon problems of application of Cali-
fornia antitrust law to union price-fixing activities. Such 
comment appears appropriate becanse of the manner in which 
the majority (pp. 885-887, ante'") treat plaintiff's con-
tention that defendant Local 256 "is not only a labor organ-
ization but also a priee fixing organization of employers," a 
combination unlawful under the Cartwright Act (Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 16700 ct s<'q.) and the common law of this state 
(Speegle v. Board of Fi,'C Underwriters (1946), Sllpm. 2!l 
Ca1.2d 34, 44 [11]). Ql1<'stions whether defendant was 01' 
was not engaged in i]]<'l!:al )'<'straint of compctition and priee-
fixing, or in an attempt to compel plaintiff to agree to sueh 
liThe essence of the mnjority's holding (pp. 886-887, ante) is thnt 
"tIle point of clause thirteen fof the demnnded eontraet] ill not price-
fixing, but wngc-1ixing, and the presence of employer-barbers in the union 
does not convert the contract into an agreement between labor groups 
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restraint, were not raised by the pleadings or mentionrd in the 
pretrial on1cr or at the trial and, since they were not pre-
sented to the trial court, its findings of fact and <.'one1nsions 
of 1m\" are not directed to them. 
IIoweYer, the question of the legality of the <.'011tra<'1 ,yJlich 
was the object of defendants' economic pressure-like the 
question of the legality of a contract which a plaintiff seeks 
to enforce or for breach of which he seeks dama!!es (Morcy v. 
Paladini (1922), 187 Cal. 727, 733·734 [2] [203 P. 7601)-
('an be raised at any stage of the proceeding, and ""'When 
the court discovers a fact which indicates that the contract is 
illegal and ought 110t to be enforced [or, here, its exeeution 
('ompelled], it will, of its O1yn motion, instigate an inquiry in 
relation thereto" (id., p. 734 [3] of 187 Cal.). 
In the present case the evidence showed and the trial conrt 
found that defendant Loeal 256 "is a labor organization 
whose membership includes .... barbers employed b~r pro-
prietors of barbershops" and also "barbers who are not em-
ployers, induding operators of bar1.)('r shops who cmplo~T other 
barbers and a very large numbrr of proprietors of barber 
shops"; that defendants "were and are seeking to extend the 
membership of the Defendant Union to all barbers working 
with the tools of the trade within the trrritorial jurisdiction 
of the Defendant Pnion whether emplo:vers or journeymen 
barbers"; and that the printed for111 of contract which de-
fendants drmanc1rd of plaintiff statrs, "13. "Whereas wnges nre 
paid on a pererntage basis tIle prices to be charged under this 
.\!!reement in nll Union barber shops not to be less than the 
following: [listing prices]." 
Then' is no finding that the praceful picketing of plaintiff 
hy I .. oca1. 256 was part of an effort b~' suell union to influee all 
('mplo~-('rs of barbrrs nnd self-employed harb('rs in the Snn 
Di('go area to agree to the seale of minimum priers ,yhidl, 
according to clause] 3 of the form of agreement present('d to 
plaintiff. nrc "to br (·llllrg;:t1 under this Agreement in all 
Fnion ba1'1)(,1" shop . ;:." But the constitution of tIl(> Jonrney-
Jl1(,1l £:11'hers. IIainll'rssel's, Cosmetologists and ProJlrietors' 
1ntcl'll:1tiona1 rllioll of AllW)'ica, ,yhi('h if; in eyidC'll(Or. shows 
that pril·e-fixing is the l11ethor1 of wage-fixing nSl'd by the 
ol'g'anizatioll.13 In these eirCUlJl:oi\;l1W(,s the quC'stion of re-
13Among the provisions of the International '8 constitution nre the 
following: 
.Article III, section 1: "Thc General Executivc Bonrd of the Interna .. j 
) 
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straint of trade is before us, and I am impelled to state the 
reasons why I cannot join in implications in the majority 
opinion that the attainment by the local union of a price-fixing 
agreement with each cmp]o~'er in the San Diego area would be 
a proper union objectiyc hecause as to each employer the 
union would be "acting alone" (ante, p. 886) to fix mini-
mum wages, not minimum prices. 
If the operator of every barber shop in the territorial juris-
diction of Local 256 were to enter into an agreement with 
Local 256 to conform to the minimum price scale set by the 
union then (whether the price scale was agreed to at the re-
quest of the operator, the behest of the union, or as a product 
of col1ective bargaining) prices would he just as fixed as if 
the operators, in their eapacities as businessmen, had agreed 
with one another to fix them. To my mind the illegality and 
undesirability of such a situation could not be removed by 
saying that no barber shop operator acting as a busincssman 
combined with any other barber shop operator so acting, or 
that the control of prices was brought about by a labor union 
which acted for the purpose of fixing wages, and therefore 
should bc deemed beyond the reach of the law. "The law re-
spects form less than substance." (Civ. Code, § 3528.) 
The "point" of a union's obtaining from businessmen an 
agreement such as clause 13 of the form of contraet here 
sought, is that the union had adopted price-fixing as a means 
of wage-fixing. Such pricc-fixing is morc than a mere inci-
tional Union is authorized to grant charters to local unions or employers' 
guilds ... 
"Sec. 3. In places where more than onc union llOlds a charter, said 
unions and guilds shall form a joint committee to regulate prices, wages, 
hours of lahor and otller working conditions .... " 
Article "II, section 6: "No Shop recognized as a union shop ... 
l111all pl'rmit the following unfair trade practices: .•. 4. The rendering 
of any seryiee in the trade area thereof for less than thc minimum prices 
('sta blishI'd in said trade area . . . 
"Scc. 11 .... Copies of thc working agreement setting forth prices, 
wages and hours and othl'r working conditions slwll be signed by the 
owner or operator signing the Shop Card agreement ... 
"Sec. 12. The contract, or agreement, called for by these laws shall he 
M construed that the person ... displaying the Shop ('ard shall speci-
1i~ally agree: ... (b) To ahide hy the laws of the local union ... 
with referencc to prices, hours, wages, an(1 working conc1itions .... " 
Artide XV, section 1. "Every local union or guild may make its own 
by-laws, \yllich must, howcyer, bc in arcOI-dance with this Constitu-
tion .... 
"Sec. ii. Eyery local union shall regulate the hours of lahor, prices 
and wages in their Tl'sl'cctiyc locality " 
) 
908 ME..<;SNER t'. JOURNEYMEN BARBERS ETC. [53 C.2d 
INTERNATIONAL UNION 
dent reasonably related to the proper union obje~tive of 
securing a wage scale;14 it is the very heart of the wage-fixing 
method chosen by the union. The line which unions cannot 
pass in restraining trade may sometimes be obscure but in 
such a situation, I think, thc ullion would clearly haye gone 
beyond that line. (Dc Ncri v. Gene Louis, Inc. (1941), 261 
App.Div. 920 [25 N.Y.S.2d 463], affirming (1940), 174 Misc. 
1000 [21 N.Y.S.2d 993, 995], modified on other grounds, 
(1942), 288 N.Y. 592 [42 N.E.2d 602]; Rcinman y. Jaffe 
(1952), 280 App.Div. 837 [113 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 [2, 3]] ; 
Commonwealth v. ~lIIcHlIgh (1950),326 Mass. 249 [93 N.E.2d 
751, 760 [8, 9]] ; Robison v. Hotel ((; Restall7"ant Employees 
(1922), 35 Idaho 439 [207 P. 132, 136] [where" [t]he pur-
pose of [concerted union activity] was, not to fix the price, or 
regulate the production of auy article of trade or commerce, 
but to better their own economic condition"].) 
As this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Traynor, 
unanimously recognized in Speegle v. B001-d of Fire Under-
write1's (1946), supra, 29 Ca1.2d 34, 44, 45, "The public in-
terest requires free competition so that prices be not depend-
ent upon an understanding among suppliers of any given 
commodity, but upon the interplay of the economic forces of 
supply and demand," and "[ C] ombinations between em-
ployers and employees present a particularly effective means of 
stifling competition." Despite the dissimilarity between occu-
pations of the persons in the Speegle case and those in this 
case, the foregoing statements of facts of ('conomic life arc 
true here if they were true therc. .And even if, as stated by 
the majority in the Petri Cleaners case (ante, p. 469), 
"An employer's decision wh('ther or not to bargain with a 
labor organization has long be(,n determined in tbi!'> state by 
the free interaction of economic forces," there are in the 
opinion of the same majority toda~' strong implications that 
the price of haircuts is 110t to be so determined. 
And if a union can fix minimum prices of a service com-
modity as a means of fixing" minimum wages. then why should 
"Pcrtinent here is the view taken hy the NLRB in mal;illg a cease 
and desist order as to conduct whirh it determined W~ s n Tnft·Hartley-
dpfined unfair lahor practice, and 1\,· the United States Supreme Court 
in upholding the hoard's determination, in Xalional Labor Relalions 
Board Y. ])r1!VCT Bldg. 4' COI1St. l'rar/cs Council (J9:il), 341 U.S. 675, 
688, 6S!) r 71 S.Ct. !143, 93 L.B,]. 1:':81]. The hO:1 r,1 foun,1 "That an 
ohject, if not the only ohject, of whnt trnnspircd" was tIle proscribed 
unfair lahor practice; the high court accepted this finding :111<1 held that 
"It is not neccssnry to find that the sole object of the strike was thnt 
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it not fix maximum prices so as to prevent employers from 
pricing themselves out of the market, decreasing the number 
of their customers, and thus being compelled to reduce the 
number of their employes? Or if a union of workers who 
furnish a service commodity can fix minimum prices of such 
commodity so as to establish a wage based on a pcrcentage of 
the price· of the service produced by the worker, why should 
not a union of workers who make objects of trade adopt a 
similar method of fixing wages by fixing the price at which 
the employer shall sell the objects' In such a situation there 
would be literally, and in my opinion, as a matter of law, a 
"combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons" 
for the forbidden purpose of fixing prices (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 16720), with the union its nexus. 
I recognize that the United States Supreme Court has 
taken a different view of the Sherman Act as amended by 
the Clayton Act (and as inevitably affected by the Norris-
La Guardia, Wagner, and Taft-Hartley Acts) from that which 
I suggest concerning the Cartwright Act. (AUen Bradley 
Co. v. Local Union No.3 (1945), 325 U.S. 797, 809, 810 [65 
S.Ct. 1533, 89 L.Ed. 1939].) Under federal law a union 
can combine to restrain commerce when it acts "alone" (e.g., 
does not enter into a competition-restraining agreement with 
a group of employers but rather "picks off" such employers 
one by one) and in union self-interest (e.g., to destroy an 
employer's business because of "personal antagonism" rather 
than to better working conditions; Hunt v. Crurnboch (1945), 
325 U.S. 821, 824-825 [65 S.Ct. 1545, 89 L.Ed. 1954]). I am 
not here concerned with and express no opinion as to the 
relevance of morals and emotions to some hypothetical case. 
I am concerned with, and cannot join in, implications of the 
majority that this court under California law should reach 
the same result concerning the propriety of a union which 
acts "alone" to restrain trade as the United States Supreme 
Court apparently has felt compelled to reach in reconciling 
federal acts which declare the policies of Congress on the 
one hand "to preserve a competitive business economy" and 
on the other hand "to prescrve the rights of labor to organize 
to better its conditions through the agency of collective bar-
gaining" (Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No.3 (1945), 
supra, p. 806 of 325 U.S.). 
Probably the California courts when they originally an-
nounced that the common law of this state forbade combina-
) 
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tions in restraint. of trade (e.g., Santa OZara Valley 'Mill & 
Lumbrr Co. v. Hayes (1888), 76 Cal. 387, 392 [18 P. 39], 
9 Am.St.TIpp. 211]) and the Legislature W}J(>l1 H p.naeted t}l(' 
Cartwright Act (Stats. ]907, ch. 530) were chiefly concerned 
with the dangers of combination of businessmelJ-enpit;;list<:. nut 
of laborers (see similar comment as to the ]890 PIUlctmpnt 
of the Sherman Act in .Apex Hosiery CO. Y. Lradn' (1940), 
310 U.S. 469, 492 [60 8.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 
1044], although during the congressional debates preceding 
adoption of the Sherman Act, an amendment exempting labor 
unions was offered and rejected; see Loewe v. Lawlor (1908), 
208 U.S. 274, 301 [28 S.Ot. 301, 52 L.Ed. 488], the Danbury 
Hatters' case). And probably the dangers of combinations 
among businessmcn and organized labor to restrain trade were 
not much in the minds of the courts when they originally 
announced that under the common law of this state workmen 
could combine and act in concert against employers to better 
working ('onditions (J. F. Pm'kinson Co. v. Building Trades 
Council (1908),154 Cal. 581 [98 P. 1027, 16 Ann.Cas. 1165, 
21 L.R.A.N.S. 550]), or much in the minds of the legislators 
when, recognizing tllat literal1y the Cartwright Act could 
be applied to outlaw labor unions, they promptly amended 
such act (Stats. 1909, ch. 362) to provide that labor was not 
a commodit~' within its meaning. But in Overla,nd Pub. Co. 
v. H. S. CI'ocker' Co. (1924), 193 Cal. 109, 115 [4], 117 [5,6] 
[222 P. 812], this court was confronted with a combination 
behveen a price-fixing trade association and unions of work-
men emplo~'ed in tIle trade, b~T virtue of which combination 
the union employes of plaintiff, a businessman' who refuscd 
to join the trade association, werc called out for the purpose 
of compelling plaintiff to join such association or be destroyed. 
The court determined that the combination violated the Cart-
wright Act, and that neither tllat act's provision that labor 
was not a commodity within its mcaning, nor the common-
law right of workmen to organize and act in concert for 
betterment of their working conditions, gave immunity to the 
subject restraint of trade. 
In today's economy we are confronted with new alignments 
which haye the inevitable effect, if not the avowed purpose, 
of restraining trade. The union's role in such alignments is 
neither that of a helpless tool of a combination of capitalists 
nor that of willing and equal coconspirator with businessml'n. 
Rather, the union assumes the initiative and attempts to coerce 
) 
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businessmen to restrain trade. I t}link (parap11rasing lan-
guage of the Allen Bradley Co. case (J945), supra, p. 808 
of 325 U.S., with reference to the Sherman Act) that the 
California Legislature never intended that unions could, con-
sistently with the Cartwright Act, coerce employers-includ-
ing employers who are also working union members-to control 
the prices of goods and services; this principle is even more 
obviously true in respect to the many barber shops wherein 
there are no real employes and all service is furnished by 
the proprietors themselves. 
As pointed out in my dissent in Petri (ante, pp. 475-476, 
477-479), the majority there declined to give effect either 
to the (k('isiollal principles of sta·re dcc£sis or to the statutory 
law as enacted in Labor Code, section 923 and related sec-
tions; today, as hereinabove shown, to the statutory law to 
be disregarded in labor relations cases, the same majority 
add the Cartwright Act. Daniel Webster said, at the funeral 
of Justice Story, "Justice is the great iuterest of man on 
earth." Regrettably, justice is not served by the majority's 
decision in Petri or their decision today. 
By departing' lightly from the principle of stare decisis 
the majority, in my view, strike at the stability of the law 
and the certainty with which its effect may be known; like-
wise, by failing to evenhandedly uphold aud apply a valid 
statute, whether liked or disliked by the individual justices, 
they contribute further to the uncertainties of the law. And 
by refusing to accept the findings of basic facts and the 
drawing of reasonable inferenees of ultimate, legally opera-
tive facts by a trial judge whose determinations in this regard 
rest upon evidence which, according to normal rules of ap-
pellate review, is legally sufficient, the majori1y encouragp 
appeals-already too frequent-which improperly seek ap. 
pellate invasion of the province of the trial judge, jury, or 
administrative fact-finder. All this, I fear, must tend not 
only to increase the financial burdens of litigants, "he case 
loads of courts, and the delays of the law but also, inevitably, 
to depreciate the esteem in which the law and its servitors-
the courts and the judges and the lawyers-are held. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that the public will aeeord no higher 
respect to this court's decisions than the court itself examples. 
For the reasons above stated, I would affirm the judgment. 
Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
